by Ashley Green-Thompson, September 1997, South Africa
THEME = POLITICS
There is a school of thought in South Africa that is
concerned about the apparent dependence the nation has on sport, to
keep the spirits alive. The national football squad sent the nation
into paroxysms of celebration, by qualifying for the World Cup in
France next year. There was popular support for the failed bid, to
host the 2004 Olympic Games. Indeed, if the socio-political scene
was a sports-field, South Africa would be a model success story.
But it is not, and the drama of life in this beautiful land
continues to unfold, painfully at times, but never without
passion.
It is always exciting to study the political landscape of a newly
liberated country. New political alliances and fractures develop,
as the population adapts to relatively normal multi-party
democracy. In the past few months, there have been a number of
realignments and positioning of parties in the national
assembly.
Perhaps he should have taken a leaf from former Irish President
Mary Robertson, and left politics on the high note that saw
him earn a Nobel peace prize, and graciously hand over power to
Mandela. Perhaps he should have ridden the storm of internal
perestroika, and stuck with former National Party (NP) General
Secretary Roelf Meyer's efforts to transform the former
ruling party. What he did, was resign at a time when the NP is
reeling from key and highly publicised defections to Meyer's New
Movement Process. F.W. De Klerk has often been accused of
being without the character and fire of his predecessors. His
almost non-existent media profile in the months preceding his
resignation, bear testimony to this. He has done nothing that even
remotely came close to his achievements of 1990 when he announced
those momentous reforms. He leaves the party secure in the
knowledge that it will not shed its apartheid past. It will not
acknowledge it's role in South Africa's sad history. Instead it
will fight the truth all the way, including a legal challenge to
the Truth Commission. It will cling unofficially to the belief of
white supremacy, and become at best, a regional power in the
Western Cape, and at worst, a spent irrelevant force with no role
in national politics.
KwaZulu-Natal is still plagued by political violence and rivalry
between ANC and Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) supporters. However,
party leaders in the province, have been engaged in ongoing
negotiations, aimed at finding a political settlement to the
conflict that has claimed 169 lives by July this year alone. These
negotiations were thrown slightly off course by two things.
The first is the belligerence of the IFP about the Truth
Commission. The IFP has refused to participate in the proceedings
of the TRC. However, many of its NP-government trained hit-squad
members are applying for amnesty, and implicating senior leaders
within the party. The IFP response has been, to threaten to
collapse the peace talks if the "witch-hunt"
continues.
The second serious blow, was the defection of one of IFP leader
Gatsha Buthelezi's chief advisers and renowned hard-liner
Walter Felgate, to the ANC. Felgate was one of the major
obstacles during the multi-party talks, that led to a national
settlement and elections in 1994. That he should be so warmly
accepted in the ANC raised the ire of not only Buthelezi, but also
of many sympathetic to the ANC movement. The information Felgate
brings with him seems important, as the IFP tries to get court
intervention to silence the defector. At the time of writing,
however, talks had been re-opened, but prospects for peace remain
gloomy.
A perception is growing, that the ANC has serious difficulty with
democratic practices within its ranks. In a number of provinces,
there have been ugly leadership disputes. One example, was the
ousting of popular Free State Province Premier, Terror
Lekota, and the imposition by the national leadership of less
popular Ivy Matsepe-Casseburi as his replacement. Again, the
decision by Gauteng Premier, Tokyo Sexwale, to seek his
fortune with the JCI mining house of prominent businessman Mzi
Khumalo, led to a difficult leadership race between provincial
party chair, Matole Motshekga, with popular grassroots
support within party ranks, and provincial Health Minister Amos
Masondo, who enjoys the backing of the National Executive
Committee.
In this instance, the membership won out, and the decision will be
taken by simple election. It does raise concerns, however, that
power blocs in the national leadership (and here it must be assumed
that Thabo Mbeki is the major broker), are seeking to
control structures at provincial and local level. What they must be
careful of, though, is a vibrant grassroots membership within the
party that could be growing tired of political machinations at head
office.
These tensions could be played out again, as the struggle for Thabo
Mbeki's successor heats up. As a certainty to replace
Mandela in December 1997 at the ANC National Congress as
leader of the party, the race for his Deputy is far from
certain. Whoever is the deputy leader of the party, will become the
de facto Deputy President of the country after the 1999
elections. Matthews Phosa, the head of the ANC Legal
Department appears to have fallen from favour in his bid for power.
While his star wanes slightly, there are rumblings that Winnie
Madikizela-Mandela is making a play for the top position. She
commands considerable support among the rank and file of the
movement, and is a survivor par excellence. At present she
could be summoned to testify at the Truth Commission, but this by
no means indicates any loss of steam in the Winnie juggernaut.
Two more unlikely allies (Roelf Meyer and Bantu Holomisa) it would
be difficult to find. Not since Buthelezi and the IFP teamed up
with Ferdi Hartzenberg and the right wing Conservative
Party, has local politics seen such a marriage of convenience.
Meyer is a "verligte" or enlightened ex-National Party
Defence Minister, and Holomisa was in charge of the Transkei
homeland located in the Eastern Cape, a stronghold of the ANC. When
he took power there by a coup, he made it a kind of liberated zone
for ANC and Pan Africanist Congress guerrillas. He became the
darling of the radical young element within the ANC stronghold of
the Eastern Cape.
That either has some political support is not in doubt, although
the ANC will dispute this. What is dubious, is their political
programme. And yet they have captured the imagination of observers,
as the only truly new political movement since 1994. It remains to
be seen how much of the establishment vote they will garner in
1999. However, if they seek to provide a serious alternative, they
will have to be more circumspect of the type of people they invite
to join them, and set some standards and principles. Former
Boputhatswana homeland despot Lucas Mangope and former
government spy Sifiso Nkabinde are hardly the stuff of real
politics, and should be dumped as soon as possible. Observers will
watch with interest the launch of the new party in late
September.
The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South
African Communist Party (SACP) and the ANC remain in a formal tri-
partite alliance, that will not split before the 1999 elections.
This is true, despite the fact that as the governing party the ANC
has been compelled by international reality and pressure, to adopt
policies that smack of World Bank/ IMF influence. This is evident
in the government's macro-economic plan called Growth, Employment
and Redistribution (GEAR). Key in this plan, is the primacy of the
private sector, and the market to generate growth, which will
ultimately trickle down to the poor in society, through more jobs.
GEAR stresses reductions in government expenditure and in
particular the reduction of the budget deficit, almost at any cost.
The 2-million member COSATU has remained loyal to the alliance, and
as a result has not been as critical of government, as it perhaps
should be. Instead, the federation has aimed its considerable
strike-power at business.
The country weathered a week-long series of strikes recently, in
which workers demanded that business should compromise on
legislation governing basic conditions of employment. It is not
likely that this compromise will happen, raising questions about
the role of the liberation movement alliance in determining
economic policy direction. In particular there is debate raging in
union ranks, on the role of COSATU within the alliance. There are
fears that the militancy of the unions is being blunted by the
regular compromises on basic worker demands.
There is also growing dissatisfaction with GEAR from other
quarters. The target figures set by Finance Minister Trevor
Manual appear to have been a thumb-suck. Growth has fallen.
Jobs are being lost. Interest rates remain high, and the value of
the Rand keeps plummeting. There are increasingly strident calls
from civil society, to revisit economic policy and to involve other
players in determining the future of the country.
The government has also put renewed energy into the
"Masakhane" (Let us Build Together) Campaign, which calls
on residents to pay for services and for arrears, that are a legacy
of rent and rate boycotts of the eighties. So far, significant
successes have been achieved in changing the public attitude. The
challenge is now on local authorities to deliver the services.
The Truth Commission is approaching the end of its mandate. It's
success in fostering reconciliation and uncovering the truth of the
country's history, remains to be assessed. In recent weeks the
nation has watched, as the killers of the popular SACP leader
Chris Hani applied for amnesty. It is unlikely that Clive
Derby-Lewis and Polish immigrant Janusz Walus will
qualify, as they blatantly refuse to disclose fully the details of
the assassination plot. More chillingly, and not related to the
legal arguments for amnesty, Derby-Lewis refused to apologise for
the murder, stating arrogantly and misguidedly that it was an act
of war for which he could not be expected to apologise. In a
macabre farce, he stated that Hani's murder was testimony of the
respect he had for his victim.
In KwaZulu-Natal, amnesty applicants are implicating senior IFP
politicians in hit-squad activities in the province. Again, the
implications for the peace process there are dire. Provincial
legislature member Philip Powell is refusing to even
acknowledge the TRC, and is prepared to defy a subpoena to testify
before the amnesty sub-committee. The message he is sending to rank
and file IFP members, only stands to make the remaining work of the
TRC more difficult.
The NP at the time of writing, had challenged the TRC in court for
not being impartial in its questioning of the party and its
erstwhile leader De Klerk, on their role in past atrocities. Civil
society organisations and commentators, are convinced that the
challenge marks the first salvo in trying to discredit the final
report of the TRC. What the nation expects, is for the NP to
apologise for the systematic violations of human rights they
inflicted on the country for close on forty years. This will prove
yet one more nail in the coffin of the National Party.
Crime continues to be a serious concern, and the popular response
is reaching ridiculous depths. Max, a zoo gorilla shot by a
confused criminal, was voted the newsmaker of the year, and has
become a hero to thousands who have had enough of crime. The
appointment of top businessman Meyer Kahn to transform the
Police Services, has yet to produce results. Justice Minister
Dullah Omar has introduced tougher bail laws. But when the
criminal justice system is all but inoperable because of shortages
of both resources and enlightened attitudes among magistrates, then
no number of draconian laws will make a difference.
On the international front South Africa's diplomats are learning
from their mistakes. President Mandela is presently trying to bring
John Garang and El Beshir together to seek a
settlement in the Sudan. This time there is a lot less fanfare and
publicity than there was when Laurent Kabila was on the
verge of ousting Mobutu in former Zaire. However, it remains to be
seen whether there will be success in bringing an equitable
solution to the strife.
Mandela is also trying to broker a settlement in East Timor. He
finds himself on the invidious position of being close to
Suharto of Indonesia, but sharing the same tradition of
resistance as Gusmao, the imprisoned leader of Fretilin.
Again, this will be a crucial test in the country's ability to
carry out it's avowed foreign policy of promoting human rights.
The five year game of transition to democracy will be concluded by
the national elections of 1999. The most popular player of 1994,
the ruling ANC, will see their popularity diminished by about 10%
to about 52%. None of the other players are doing any better,
though, and early surveys indicate that they will also lose some
support. Roelf and Bantu stand to gain as the only newcomers to the
game. There is also an outside chance of the IFP, the small but
vocal Democratic Party, the NP and others gaining about 40% of the
vote in an oppositional coalition.
For the second five-year mandate, the electorate will be more
critical of government performance than in 1994. On present
indicators, there is likely to be great disillusionment, resulting
in lower turnout at the polls. However, this could open the door
for a radical party of the poor and working class, led by the South
African Communist Party and COSATU, that could provide serious
challenge to the dominant ANC in the new millennium. South African
politics continues to be far more interesting than sport and
games.
END