ANB-BIA SUPPLEMENT - ISSUE/EDITION Nr 334 - 15/11/1997

ANB-BIA SUPPLEMENT

ISSUE/EDITION Nr 334 - 15/11/1997

CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE


BURUNDI

No dialogue - only war

by Albert Mbonerane, Germany, October 1997

THEME = CIVIL WAR

INTRODUCTION

Dialogue or no dialogue? For Julius Nyerere and the Bishops of Burundi, there is no alternative
to dialogue. But for others, any overture whatsoever towards the killers is equal to high treason

At a press conference on 13 May 1997, Major Buyoya revealed that his government had started peace negotiations in Rome with the National Council for Defence and Democracy (CNDD) and that minutes confirming this had been signed on 10 March 1997 under the auspices of the Saint Egidio Community in Rome. This information was received in different ways.

The Front for Democracy in Burundi (FRODEBU) welcomed the step forward, but asked that all parties to the conflict and not just the government and the CNDD, be involved in the negotiations, and that such negotiations be held in a country close to Burundi.

The Speaker of the National Assembly congratulated the government and the CNDD, but he also felt that negotiations should involve all, including the National Assembly.

The Rally for Democracy and Economic Development (RADES), a small Tutsi extremist party, considered the negotiations a good thing, even though they repeated that they will not negotiate with the "killers".

The Union for National Progress's (UPRONA) leader, Charles Mukasi, considered the negotiations to be "high treason". It was out of the question for them to negotiate with those he called "killers". The UPRONA group in Parliament disapproved of the way in which UPRONA's leader had acted precipitously without even consulting the party's authorised bodies". They disassociated themselves completely from "those who in a misplaced fashion, accused the country's leaders of high treason".

The Catholic Bishops' Conference addressed a pressing appeal to the country's political leaders, to include in the negotiations, all those who have grievances. They reminded their fellow citizens, that only dialogue can guarantee a rapid return to peace.

UPRONA about to explode

UPRONA is divided within itself over the question of negotiations. There are two opinions within the party: The first which supports Major Buyoya's peace moves; the other which considers the "Rome talks to be betraying the entire nation and the memory of the victims of the genocide". The latter are convinced that entering into partnership with killers' organisations, will never result in peace. Eventually, UPRONAs Central Committee gave their support to the President.

With this backing, Mr. Mukasi called a press conference on 28 May and explained why he is opposed to Major Buyoya's stance. Rejecting all Buyoya's arguments supporting negotiations, UPRONA's leader said: "The only service Buyoya can render his fellow citizens, is to steer clear of the CNDD killers, and wage an all- out war against them, at a diplomatic and political level, as well in the Media".

Within UPRONA, who supports Mukasi and who supports Buyoya? Indeed, is Buyoya likely to have decided to have started negotiating his own, without first having referred back to the party leaders? It's difficult to believe, as three quarters of his ministers are UPRONA activists.

University and trade unions oppose negotiations

This cacophony within UPRONA was followed by a demonstration by Bujumbura University students, protesting against the negotiations. On 21 May 1997, these were joined by students from Gitega Agricultural Science Institute. (The demonstration organisers included those who took part in the 1996 killing of 27 Hutu finalist).

The same day, representatives of 23 Burundian pro-Tutsi trade unions, protested against talks that had started in Rome between the government and the CNDD. In a statement, issued on 17 May 1997 in Bujumbura, the unions warned the government against disregarding their position. "If this continues", said the unions, "After consultation with our rank-and-file members, the unions will be compelled to work out a strategy, to counter the drift towards negotiations with killers of that type".

The Association of Burundi University Professors took the same position. The Association said: "We leave posterity to judge the government's action in cohabiting with an enemy who kills Burundi's children, students, women and the elderly. For the first time", notes the Association, "we have a government negotiating with criminals guilty of genocide, arguing that it is the only way to bring about peace".

It's not surprising the students protested against the negotiations. After all, on 11 and 12 June, some of them had killed or encouraged others to kill their fellow students on campus, with the military looking on. Some professors were also killed (e.g. Stanislas Zuzenza), or were forced to leave the country at the instigation of some of their colleagues.

Deadlock

Buyoya's government is trying to explain to Burundians why they have chosen this very moment to enter into peace negotiations. No easy matter, because Tutsi extremists fiercely oppose the government. Will Buyoya be able to convince the army that the war must truly end, or is this a mere diversion?

Whatever the situation, Buyoya's team has no other choice: they must undertake these negotiations and try to convince those who oppose their action: viz: the UPRONA leaders, the University professors, the students and the Tutsi unions.

Who are the Burundians opposed to the very principle of negotiating? There are several categories:

- Politicians, who have run the country as if it were their own and who must be held accountable for the 1965, 1969, 1972-73 massacres. They're the very same who are dead scared they're going to one day have to answer for their actions.

- The military and civilian authorities who took part in President Ndadaye's assassination and who took part in the killings of Burundians since 1993.

- Those in Burundi who originated and organised the ethnic purification in urban centres and schools.

- Politicians and businessmen who avail themselves of the on-going war situation to make good money.

- Politicians who originated the system of "relocation camps" as a means of exterminating the Hutu.

- A minority of Hutu politicians who peacefully live in Bujumbura and who don't give a damn for the dreadful living conditions of the people who have been re-grouped, dispersed and displaced. So far, the war hasn't touched them. They're living in town, their children have enough food and go to school every day, and yet, they are the very ones who both talk about the protection of minorities and who are opposed to negotiations.

Their strategy consists in accusing others of their own crimes by brandishing the word "genocide", which has become almighty after the events in Rwanda. A cold look at Burundi's history shows the executioners as victims and victims as "criminals".

Those presently in power interpret the facts of history in their own way. If a soldier, attempting to overthrow a government, fails, he's court martialled as a rebel. If he succeeds, he's acclaimed as a hero, a liberator. Who's really the hero and who's really the rebel in Burundi's confused history? On 1 November 1976, President Micombero was replaced by Colonel Bagaza in a "palace coup". Bagaza was overthrown on 3 September 1987 in a coup led by Major Pierre Buyoya. Buyoya was defeated in the 1 June 1993 presidential elections and Melchior Ndadaye took over as President. On 21 October 1993, President Ndadaye was assassinated and he was replaced in February 1994 by Cyprien Ntaryamira. After just two months in office, President Ntaryamira was killed in an airplane over Kigali, Rwanda. Sylvestre Ntibantunganya immediately took over as interim president. On 25 July 1996 Major Pierre Buyoya staged a come-back and seized power for the second time.

The Arusha refusal

Negotiations, scheduled to start in Rome in May 1997, haven't yet got off the ground. In order to avoid going to Rome, Buyoya involved UNESCO in the political game. UNESCO was planning to hold a meeting in July 1997, but that did not materialise because Switzerland, abiding by its human rights policy, refused to issue visas to some members of the Burundi government delegation, suspected of having taken part in President Ndadaye's assassination.

Tanzania's Julius Nyerere, the mediator in the present crisis, then decided to re-open negotiations in Arusha, Tanzania. After repeated consultations, Buyoya's government agreed to go to Arusha, and the meeting was set to take place on 25 August 1997. All parties to the conflict were invited, including SOJEDEM (Union for the Defense of Minorities' Rights þ a Tutsi extremist organisation), The Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (PALIPEHUTU) and FROLINA(Front for National Liberation þ an armed Hutu movement). For all of them, it was the first time to be involved in such negotiations.

On 16 August, ahead of the Arusha meeting, a summit of Foreign Affairs Ministers belonging to those countries which had imposed an embargo on Burundi, was held in Kampala, Uganda. In spite of Bujumbura's intense diplomacy, it was decided to maintain the sanctions. This was a real check for Burundi's Foreign Minister who had staked everything on the embargo being lifted. In spite of this snub, Bujumbura confirmed its participation in the Arusha talks.

Then came 23 August, and Burundi's government, to everyone's surprise, declared that "it was not in a position to go to Arusha" and also prevented the other delegations from leaving the country. What was the feeling in Burundi official circles? Charles Mukasi had said: "I'm not going to Arusha" and so Buyoya wouldn't go either. Confronted with opposition to the negotiations within his own party and tribe, Major Buyoya is now falling between two camps. It's rumoured in Bujumbura that Buyoya doesn't really want negotiations. The only difference being that Mukasi is saying it openly.

It should be noted as well, that Buyoya's government had been none too pleased with the United Nations Security Council, which had rejected Burundi's request to create an international criminal tribunal for Burundi. So, on 31 July 1997, hoping to shock the Opposition and provoke them into refusing the negotiations, the government had ordered the execution of six defenceless citizens. Buyoya was extremely put-out to learn that in spite of the executions, the Opposition had accepted to go to Arusha.

False pretences

Finding it was getting nowhere, the government looked for another angle for its diplomacy, and sought to create suspicion between neighbouring countries, by accusing Julius Nyerere of no longer being impartial. The government demanded that negotiations should take place in a country other than Tanzania, and that other mediators should be appointed, in addition to Nyerere.

Also, the government urged that an effort be made to mediate between Tanzania and Burundi in their present difficulties - a good way to distract international opinion and win some time. Major Buyoya had made a bet. When he took power, he gave himself three years and he asked not to be hustled. He knows that after June 1998, the Burundi Democratic Front (FRODEBU) will no longer be in a position to claim any legitimacy, even if it has never really been ruling the country. Buyoya will have to have his wits about him to survive.

Parliamentary elections had been held on 29 June 1993 with FRODEBU winning the elections. From then on, the army did its utmost to destroy the democratic institutions resulting from the elections. It's clear that the army and the judiciary need restructuring, and that the country needs a political system that grants the same chances and the same rights to all Burundians.

Major Buyoya has now joined those who are opposed to negotiations. His situation is embarrassing. Western governments believe him to be a democrat, so he's compelled to say that he will negotiate, and that there will be, what is described as a "national debate". Yet he knows only too well, that those who asked him to take responsibility for the coup d'état, will not allow him to negotiate, even if he wants to. He's now appointed a Peace Minister.

Can UNESCO, which seems to have the confidence of Bujumbura, have any mediating influence, resulting in some hope for the future? There's no use in cherishing illusions. The Paris meeting in Paris, 27-28 September, didn't make any progress. Today, the Burundi government doesn't want to hear anything more about "Arusha". And if tomorrow, the other negotiators say they don't want "Paris, Geneva or any other city in that neck of the woods", is there any hope for peace negotiations?

It's important for Burundians to be honest with each other, also, the international community must support initiatives coming from Africa and appreciate that reasonable efforts are being made on many sides to bring peace. As for the international community, it ought to support initiatives coming from Africa. It's sad to say, that the only ones seeming to have a proper appreciation of the urgent need for negotiations, are the displaced, the dispersed, those who have been "re- grouped" and refugees. Unfortunately, they have no right to speak. They will have to wait until those who eat three meals a day, decide their fate.

As Nyerere said: "There is no alternative to dialogue".

END

CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE


PeaceLink 1997 - Reproduction authorised, with usual acknowledgement