ANB-BIA SUPPLEMENT

ISSUE/EDITION Nr 349 - 01/07/1998

CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS



Congo-Brazzaville

Who gains from inter-ethnic strife?


by Sylphes Mangaya, Congo-Brazza, April 1998

THEME = CIVIL WAR

INTRODUCTION

When they fail to get out in time from war- zones,
the Congolese fall into the hands of those combatants who carry out ethnic cleansing.
This is planned murder euphemistically described as being "just a mistake"!

There's not much in the way of hand-to-hand engagements when war breaks out in Brazzaville. Both sides avoid battle. They prefer the cowardly way of shelling the civilian population - soft targets for savage conflicts. Under the appearance of war, things rapidly degenerate into settling inter-ethnic scores. Combatants, drugged and armed, engage in organised massacres which have cost the lives of thousands of civilians. There were 5,000 deaths during the first war of 1993/94, and 15,000 in 1997. In the first hours of the war of June 1997, we saw how the "Cobra" militia of General Denis Nguesso, and the "Cocoya" militia of Pascal Lissouba went on what amounted to man-hunts. People were screened at road blocks set up by the militia at every street corner. If their identity papers did not match either the region they came from or their declared ethnic origin, then the unfortunate citizens being checked, were systematically killed. Both groups of militia used the same "methods" when controlling passers-by. If something was missing from travellers' identity papers, they were interrogated in their local language. The Cobra, who controlled the northern part of the city, asked their questions in Lingala or in another language spoken in the north of the country. But if you happened to pass through areas controlled by the Cocoya, you had better answer in Lari or Kituba...or else!

Not all war damage to houses was caused by shelling. Take for example the area near the airport. Once the Cocoya lost ground there, the houses of the Nibolek (belonging to the electoral district of Pascal Lissouba) were destroyed and burned by the Cobra. It was the same story in many other places. The Cocoya operated a similar policy regarding the houses of those who lived in the north - Sassou Nguesso's bailiwick. Many of the wounded in hospitals were finished off by armed men during the night, as happened in the University Hospital Centre of Brazzaville and in Makélékélé Hospital.

Man-hunts

The same barbarous conduct took place during the November 1993 to January 1994 war, in which the Nibolek were fighting the Tcheks (a name given to Bernard Kotelas' supporters living in the Pool area). The Tcheks' houses were first pillaged and then demolished. Men, women and children were cold-bloodily executed. The Tcheks took violent reprisals - in many areas, Lissouba's supporters were massacred. Man-hunts became widespread in the southern regions of the country.

Since the end of the 1997 war, very few Nibolek have dared return to Brazzaville, because they have not won electoral control over any area. The capital city has become too small and too dangerous for them. Once the situation worsens in Brazzaville, the Nibolek are often the first victims of extortion. The areas where they were once strongly represented, are almost empty because they're afraid to return there. Most of the Nibolek still to be found in Brazzaville, live in Bacongo or Makélékélé, where they had been chased away from, five years ago. According to Mr Kolelas who was Lissouba's provisional prime minister: "At the height of the June-October 1997 war, the Nibolek were welcomed like brothers". He added: "This is their home and not a hair of their heads will be touched". This doesn't please his former ally, Sassou Nguesso, who thinks that Kolelas, in the name of the Union for Democratic Renewal-United Democratic Forces alliance (URD-FDU), should organise a man-hunt against the Nibolek in his area.

In 1995, a year after the clashes in the southern regions, northern Congo almost exploded. Sangha, a region close to Cameroon was the scene of violence between various local tribes - the Bakoule, Dzem, Sanga Sanga, Bamossa, Lino etc ... and the "Ekwile", i.e. the "foreigners" in the Koele language. These barbarous xenophobic tensions were conducted by what was called "The Front For The Defence Of The Interests Of The Youth Of Sangha (FDUS), an association which claimed to be non- political. The Front said that every Congolese citizen must live and work in the region he/she comes from, and was supported by the young people who took this as an excuse to intimidate and brutalise the "NOS" - the name given to people who did not come from Sangha. Their main victims were the workers in the forestry industry in that area.

Intimidation strategy

Armed with knives, hunting guns or automatic weapons, members of the association fanned out in the direction of the forestry companies and ordered the authorities to sack non-locals, and to hire the young people of Sangha. In April 1995, clashes nearly erupted between the leaders of the Front and the NOS. At the end of November the same year, some members of the Front intervened at Tala-Tala, a small locality to the north of Ouesso, the capital of Sangha, to expel Mr. Eugene Ezebe, an accountant with the Congolese-Arabo Libyan forestry company (SOCALYB) who came from a neighbouring region of Likouala. The reason put forward by the Front: that he had blocked the recruitment of local youth of the area. Even Cameroonians working in this area were the target of Front militants.

Nor was the public sector spared their attentions. The Front wanted all the officials of the region to be local people. Thus, during 1995, fearing for their lives, 40 teachers left the area without waiting for another appointment. There were many other departures in the administrative services. Observing what was happening, all the various regional institutions supported the Front. The NOS contemplated creating an "Ekwile" association comprised of all the original inhabitants of the different regions of Congo. Very quickly, the authorities of Sangha reacted, by preventing them from going ahead with this plan, so as to avoid the country's balkanisation.

Who gains?

At the end of the day, who profits from all these ethnic divisions which has killed many Congolese for decades? It's well known that at the height of the Marxist military regime, Peking and Moscow wanted to exploit inter-ethnic rivalries in Africa, so as to establish a communist regime. In the Congo, the Soviets thought that the people of the north were more likely to accept a Marxist-Leninist ideology. And the Laris, inhabitants of Pool, who did not accept this philosophy, were considered to be "counter revolutionaries" and "local lackeys of imperialism". Obviously a people to be kept down!

Thus, between 1963, when the socialist regime was introduced in the Congo, and the 1990s which marked the end of monolithic regimes in Africa, Pool lost its way; from being high-ranking officials and tradesmen, the local inhabitants became farmers. A people so much victimised did not have the means to oppose the political violence which was inflicted on them. They had to wait for the 1990s to acquire the means of defending themselves - with the dreaded Ninja - a militia led by Kolelas. Their objective: never again to be ill-treated by any regime whatsoever.

Today, the Congo's ethnic problems are worse than ever. It's true that since the end of the war, nobody is harassed in the streets because of race or origin. It's encouraging to note that the people of Niboland are re-establishing themselves in areas like Moungali, Moukondo and Plateau which were on the front lines during the troubles. But some observers wonder whether the "Elf lobby", which financed the war in the Congo, is not dancing on the ashes of Moscow by exploiting the same frustrations which are tearing apart this little central African country with its denuded economy.

As soon as the war broke out in 1997, the Democratic and Patriotic Force (FDP) quickly proclaimed that this was a war between north and south. Thus, many young people of the north were recruited into Sassou Nguesso's Cobra militia. After the FDP's victory, achieved with Angola's help, there was despair in the south. People expected a negotiated peace rather than one imposed by force of arms. What was euphemistically called "freedom" (a concept dear to the hearts of northerners) was seen in the south as a defeat. That's why some people (especially southerners) certainly don't consider the FDP to be a social movement which got rid of a hated regime. For them, this was no "revolution". So what happened? The people of the south remained passive after the General's victory. Taking all the credit, the present regime, because it was victorious, calls Lissouba's government - "genocidal". This was repeated during the National Forum held in Brazzaville in January. But the question remains. What part did Elf and France play in this genocide? After all, it is they who were mainly responsible for allowing the situation to deteriorate by supporting the FDP both financially and militarily?

As a result, we are now experiencing in the Congo, an ethnic radicalization both in the north and in the south. France's method of restoring a friend to power has done nothing to smooth over those inter-ethnic tensions which have rent the Congo for decades. On the contrary, the bitterness is greater than ever. Everybody knows that in a country like the Congo, a country of repeated wars, it is not today or tomorrow that a Commission of Enquiry will be held. The past holds too much just to smooth things over like that!

END

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