CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by Missé Nanando, Chad, October 1998
THEME = ISLAM
Despite the many signs of a creeping islamisation of the country,
is an Islamic Chad conceivable?
Like some sinister bogey-man, the subject regularly returns to the national political forum. It was concealed, if not deliberately excluded from debates at the National Conference. Some recognise it in the spread of Arabic, and hence, controversial, given the bilingualism imposed on the country. So Islam can't be a topic for quiet debate.
"I refused to pray behind Imam Gaddafi on the 1 May 1998", (date of Gaddafi's visit to Chad)", said Al Hadj Garondé Djama, a practising Muslim. If for many, this riposte was the settling of old scores between Al Hadj Garondé Djama and Gaddafi, the social and political- religious climate allows us to ask why the country in these latter days, leans more and more towards the Arab Middle East? In other words, is it conceivable that Chad might become an Islamic state one day?
Many factors drawn from the political and socio-economic situation, bring to light signs of an ever increasing islamisation of the country. The imaginary boundary running from Muliwi country and following the right bank of the Bahr Aouk, has shifted, so that today it reaches the town of Baibakoum. This sliding of the islamic boundary towards the south, can be explained by 2 or 3 facts.
First of all, there's the situation in the large urban centres full of young merchants - Arabs, Kanembou, Haussa, Foulbé, or Ouaddaïen. These increase the chances for young Christians and animists from the south of the country to convert to Islam for socio-economic reasons. This is very apparent in the huge markets of Moundou and Sarh. Young Saras are employed selling the goods of their Muslim "friends". Under the pretext of being better integrated into commercial life, these young people even refuse to speak their mother tongue (be it Sar or Ngambaye) in favour of Arabic. Even worse, they use the sakane, a sort of kettle, for making tea or for ritual ablutions. This at the expense of their parents' hoe, or their school exercise and text books.
A recent survey, cites numerous southerners converted to Islam. These conversions started in 1982 when the Armed Forces of the North (FAN) of Hissené Habré took power. It was then that the islamised ethnic Gorone fighters garrisoned in the south, launched a campaign of conversion to Islam, often through coercion. It was at a time when the fighters were on half pay, so aware of the power of both politics and money possessed by these young guerrillas, numerous southerners converted to Islam, though more out of convenience and the assurance of a square meal.
Finally, account must also be taken of an Islamic revival much more organised and resourceful which is penetrating Chad at all levels. Islam has always had the support of 3 main props for its extension: preaching (da'wa), holy war (jihad) and the activities of its fraternities (turûg). The preaching is blared out through loud-speakers at every hour of the day and night, broadcasting Koranic verses with no regard for the peace of neighbours or of other religious persuasions.
As regards armed combat in the name of Allah, this presupposes an army of faithful, organised and disciplined, and hence a state, which is not yet in place to spread Islam throughout the land.
However, the activities of religious associations (turûg) is very apparent in N'Djaména and even right out in country areas. Certain Middle-Eastern states have allocated some tidy sums of money to their Chadian counterparts for building mosques and helping likely converts. For example, for 20 km around Sarh, each village has its groups of young people congregating around their faqi as they recite the Koran. This is an entirely new phenomena in Sara country. In the villages the best durable buildings (in cement) are the mosques.
For an observer of Chad's politics, legion are the signs of a general islamisation of the country. The signing of an agreement between the government and the Society Promoting Islam are right in the line of the will to islamise the country, whatever the cost.
That agreement was followed by Gaddafi's visit to N'Djaména. This occasion saw faithful Chadian Muslims rally to pray behind him, not as President of a friendly state, but as an Imam. The attitude of the authorities was blatantly pro-islamic. The Minister of Communication, Haroun Kabadi, described the visit as "a significant event for Chad." His colleague, Mohament Salah Anadif, the Foreign Minister, called it a sigh of "good neighbourliness and mutual cooperation." But as far as Libya is concerned, "good neighbourliness" means falling in line with its politics and philosophy.....Well, for Gaddafi, that means the promotion of Arab Muslim culture and the granting of funds to Muslims. Grène Salah Grène, Libyan ambassador to Chad, expressed this euphonically as "our ambitions in Africa are solely to help our African brothers to free themselves and fulfil their destiny." But does Chad need to be freed from one yoke only to be loaded with another whose consequences are "difficult to envisage." Aid, by definition, has its counterpart. We all know there's no such thing as a "free lunch," and Chad has already paid the price for such philanthropic talk. The moment is far from opportune, above all at this stage of the socio-political revolution.
In view of all this, is there a risk of Chad becoming an Islamic state? Probably not, if its history is anything to go by. It has to be recognised that the spread of Islam in Chad was unconnected with the original expansion which occurred during the first century of the Muslim era. Even the jihâd of the conqueror Okba Iban Nafé in 666-667 A.D. against the Fezzan and the Kwar, taking in some 600 km of Chad, provoked no Islamic movement here at home. The same goes for the Azab nomads who camped behind their beasts across the plains on the ruins of the ancient Christian kingdoms, after the breakup of the state of Dongola. They were far from being the vehicles for spreading Islam. Even at that early date, the pre-colonial Chadian states were already islamised.
The extension of islamic civilisation in the north of Chad was achieved without conquest or military action. This can explain the slowness of its penetration in the heart of the mass of the ordinary people. That is related to the survival of pre-islamic rites in areas predominantly islamic today. For example, the Chadian sultans cannot deny the animist traditional power form which their religious and temporal authority has sprung. They have need of a synthetic Islam on which to base their legitimacy. Such an attitude does not encourage the imposition of Islam on other Chadians.
Regarding the fraternities (turûq) which are in fact the launch pads for the islamisation of Chad, and despite their zeal in these latter days, they are limited to their mystical and warrior appeal as seem among our neighbours. Apart from the Tidyanyya, the Senoussaya and the Wahabbya who have only recently been introduced into the country, are generally unpopular among Chadian Muslims, and so have difficulty taking root.
Drawing on these historical facts of the expansion of Islam in Chad - facts on which a dubious national unity and relative political stability are supposedly built - it's apparent that the islamic movement has difficulty taking root in hostile soil. The proliferation of centres of worship (especially Protestant), the stand taken by the supporters of liberty and secularism, and the tendency of the westernised classes to protect their own pressure, all dates the proclamation of an islamic state in Chad. You can add to this the animosity of certain groups - Christian, animist and Muslim, besides the generally affable nature of most Chadians.
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