CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by A. Green-Thompson & S. O'Leary, South Africa, March 1999
THEME = ELECTIONS
June 2 1999:
South Africa's National & Provincial Elections
It is hard to believe that the June 1999 election will in fact be the first real democratic election in South Africa. The 27 April 1994 election was the culmination of years of struggle against a corrupt and illegitimate regime; an election fought by freedom fighters who had switched from the bullet to the ballot. Five years down the line, many of these freedom fighters are now seasoned parliamentarians. They are slowly but surely coming to the realisation that the struggle for a decent life for all in the post apartheid era, is far more daunting than expected. The initial shared assumption was that achieving political power would be sufficient to bring about change. But the sobering reality of the post-apartheid dispensation, is that economic power has become all-important.
Five years of democracy has also claimed a few casualties. Many former freedom fighters and trade unionists, have cast aside their militant pre-1994 slogans and become instant millionaires as they embrace capitalism and take up position in black empowerment consortiums. «Even the Dead», a poetry collection published in 1997, by South African Communist Party Deputy Secretary-General Jeremy Cronin, expressed the view that many in the former liberation movement and elsewhere, were feeling: «Having abolished the bosses, we became the bosses.» Cronin questions whether black empowerment is doing what it's name implies, or creating a small black elite drawn from the former liberation movement. Statistics, if they are to be believed, bear this out. A year ago the richest 20% of the population took home 63% of the wealth, while the poorest 20% made do with just 3%. Can one even begin to speak of empowerment when employment continues to drop and joblessness stands at between 27% and 37%? The reality is, that the economy has shed more than half a million jobs since 1994.
Not all is doom and gloom, however. The fledgling democracy has had remarkable achievements. The promise of 1 million new houses in 5 years, has seen over 700,000 new houses going up, with the prospects for another 100,000 this year looking good. Millions of lives have been changed for the better, through access to running water and electricity. Over the past 5 years, close on half the national budget each year has gone to social services. While reform of the health and educational system still remains a difficult process, changes are nonetheless becoming evident. South Africa has moved from a highly sophisticated curative health system to a widespread preventative system with relatively few casualties. The country not only remains stable, but through the inclusion of constitutional checks and balances, has created a structure that will ensure the continuation of such stability. And so, South Africa moves to a normal democratic election in June.
One of the central issues for the outside world has been the question of the post Mandela era. It is a sign of the maturity of the new state, that this is not an issue within the country. All accept and wish President Mandela well in his retirement, and the country is resigned to the fact that Thabo Mbeki will take over. Nobody expects him to walk in Mandela's shoes, nor to emulate his stature. But his quiet diplomacy and knowledge of politics, bodes well for the transition process. However, it is widely expected that the honeymoon period for whites will be over, and Mbeki will not bend over backwards as Mandela has done, to accommodate their fears and insecurities. In addition, the five years of enforced power sharing through a government of national unity that was part of the negotiated settlement, comes to an end.
Speculation is rife about Mbeki's successor as Vice-President. The most likely candidate is ANC Deputy President Jacob Zuma. The possibility cannot be ruled out that this key position could be given by Inkatha Fredom Party (IFP) leader, Mangosuthu Buthelezi, as an incentive for a closer relationship between the two parties.
Mandela will not be the only one leaving the corridors of power in June. With him will go the old guard, many of whom were either in prison or exile in the past, and received their senior positions largely in recognition of their role in the struggle. It is generally accepted that some of these people have not made a significant contribution to transformation of the state. This exodus opens the way for some jockeying for positions for the emerging leadership.
A worry that many South Africans have is that Mbeki seems to surround himself with «his own people», and there is a fear that loyalty may override considerations of competence in the selection of the new cabinet.
The election itself is shrouded in a number of controversies. The first of these, relates to the fact that for this election, a voters' roll have been established. This means that voters can only cast their vote where they have registered. To register, a valid South African identity document is required, but with the stipulation that it possesses a bar code. These were introduced in 1986, which means that many people still retain the old non- bar coded document. In essence, these people will forfeit the right to vote, unless they apply for new documents. This has precipitated a constitutional challenge by two of the opposition parties, the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Party (DP). However, this effort should not be seen as altruism and commitment to the democratic process. It would seem that a significant number of the white community are holders of the old documentation, and as they are less likely to vote for the ruling party, it is in the interest of opposition parties to garner their support.
A second area of controversy, is over the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), an independent statutory body charged with running elections. The resignation of the Chair, Judge Johan Kriegler, the person who held the same position in 1994, sent shock-waves through South Africa. Reading between the lines, his independence seemed to be in question, and his fight to secure more funding for the IEC, only added to tension with the government. It is acknowledged, however, that his departure succeeded in smoothing the way for better co-operation between government and the IEC.
Despite these controversies, the outcome of the el-ection is not difficult to predict. The ANC will win hands down. It would like to win a two-thirds majority and thus win the right to change the Constitution in order to speed up transformation. In 1994 it received 62.8% of the national vote. The feeling in the country now is that it will drop a few percentage points and emerge with between 55%-58%. The reason is quite simple. For millions of South Africans, there has been little change in their daily lives since 1994. And while these people will not vote for anyone else, they will vote with their feet by staying away from the polls. Apathy and not the opposition remains the ANC's greatest challenge.
The ANC's victory will not come because of its track record in delivering on 1994 promises, but rather because there is no credible opposition party. The New National Party (NNP) has been a floundering ship, unable to shake off the legacy of apartheid. The party's failure to adapt to life out of power, has resulted in a mass exodus from the party. Its new leader, Marthinus van Schalkwyk, considered a lightweight in the political arena, personifies the demise of the once all powerful apartheid party. From 23% in 1994, it will be lucky to get 10% this time round.
Despite the fact that over 42 parties have registered for the election, there is no other party that will receive more than 5%. The wooing of Mangosuthu Buthelezi by the ANC would indicate that the IFP will also lose votes, but not significantly. It may capture 5% and be on par with the Democratic Party (DP), a quasi- liberal gathering of people who no longer feel at home in the NNP, but who still want to remain part of a white elite. Parties that did make small contributions in 1994 such as the Freedom Front, an ultra conservative Afrikaner party, and the Pan Africanist Congress, seen as left of the ANC, are slowly descending into obscurity. It would be a surprise if either got more than 2% of the vote.
There is the slight possibility of the formation of a loose coalition whose driving force would be opposition to the ANC. Here, more than anywhere else, the United Democratic Movement (UDM) comes into its own. Though made up of two strange bedfellows, Roelf Meyer, former NP progressive and chief negotiator, and Bantu Holomisa, expelled ANC dissident and former homeland dictator, the UDM may appeal to those wishing to register a vote in favour of an alternative to the ANC. It is very difficult to predict how well it will do. Its strength lies in the possibility of forming an opposition alliance. It must be said, though, that this will have very little bearing on the outcome of the election. The ANC strength is its lack of opposition.
As the eyes of the world look toward South Africa and the June election, the country itself will keenly watch the nine provincial elections that will happen simultaneously. Presently, the ANC controls seven, with the IFP in charge in KwaZulu Natal, and the NNP in the Western Cape. With the dalliance between the ANC and IFP, it is quite possible that the ANC will take KwaZulu Natal. The Western Cape is more difficult to predict. While the NNP has lost popularity in recent times, the same must be said of the ANC. Here we may see a coalition government.
The importance of the June 2 election in the ongoing transformation of South Africa, has also seen organisations of civil society coalescing behind the leadership of the Church in order to observe the process. This should go some way in easing some of the tension that is always associated with electioneering in South Africa. What is a certainty, is that the next five years of democratic governance on this southern tip of Africa, will be interesting.
END
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