CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by Adélan Zando, Togo, April 1999
THEME = DEMOCRACY
Togo's President Gnassingbe Eyadéma is a past master at
manipulating elections.
His people only hope for a peaceful change of government
On the 9 April this year, President Ibrahim Baré Maďnassara, Niger's head of state, was killed by members of his personal bodyguard. He had often visited Lomé in Togo, or sent messengers seeking advice from Eyadéma, advice always valued by some members of the international community. Even more recently, President Ange-Felix Patassé of the Central African Republic, who, during his period of exile had taken refuge in Lomé where he had married a Togolese woman, also went to Pia, stronghold of the Togo's head of state, to listen to the "sage"'s advice.
Eyadéma has been master of Togo, off and on, for the past 32 years and seems to benefit from involvement in the affairs of other countries in the region, rather than his in own. His many interventions in the affairs of other States, his insistence, despite appearing importunate, and his perseverance, often leads him to impose his views on his peers who in turn, dare not dismiss him, both because that is not done among brother-leaders, and from fear of his ability to cause harm.
Eyadéma often advises his presidential guests to use his methods of blatantly violating the electoral process (described by the Togolese press as "high-jacking the elections". It was following a visit by a Nigérien delegation to Eyadéma in Pia, that Niger's President Ibrahim Baré Maďnassara, took it into his head to dissolve Niger's National Electoral Commission. And this at a time when his own coup d'état was being called into question by the Nigérien population! And whose to say that Eyadéma's "home- spun" advice didn't have a part to play in the catastrophe which struck President Habyarimana of Rwanda? (Editor's note: On 6 April 1994, the plane carrying Habyarimana and President Ntaryamira of Burundi was brought down by rocket fire. Both Presidents were killed).
Since 1993 when he won the presidential poll, Eyadéma has continually attacked the electoral process, which means it is difficult for the country to arrive at any meaningful political change. He appears to be an inveterate plotter against his own people's most cherished aspirations for peaceful change. Through the democratic process, Togo's citizens should be the ones who decide what happens within their own country, but they're being taken for a ride. To talk of the "sovereign will of the people" is a big joke within a Togolese context - a country having a government which pretends to encourage the onward course for democracy in Africa, but which at home is anything but "democratic".
Let's see what happened in Togo on 21 June 1998. Preparations had gone ahead, with party leaders (both on the President's side and the Opposition) agreeing to the way in which the elections should be organised. When election day came around, with the exception of Lomé, where the military smashed the voting boxes, everything seemed to pas off peacefully and in good order. There was nothing to show what was going to happen. Nothing to warn people that the National Electoral Commission (CEN), the sole body authorised to ensure the elections were carried out in due and proper form, would be sabotaged and that the government would then call in the Interior Minister, General Seyi Memene. (Editor's note: Under Togo's electoral laws, the Interior Ministry organises the national elections, but supervision and declaration of provisional results are done by the CEN.)
The sabotage tactics were simple. The CEN had nine members - four from the presidential party, four from the Opposition, plus the president of the Commission. So what happened? First of all, the four government nominees resigned en masse. But the Commission still had a quorum to continue its work. In order to block this, pressure was said to have been put on the president, Mrs Awa, forcing her to resign as well.
The plot thickened. Everything was going so well that the party in power, sure of victory, invited journalists and the public to attend the election night rally, during which the results were to be published as soon as the regional electoral commissions sent them in to the CEN. (The latter alone had the authority to send the results to the Constitutional Court, which would then made the final announcement.)
But General Memene then announced that Mrs Awa's resignation together with that of her four colleagues, had rendered the CEN incapable of discharging its constitutional duty and obligation of declaring the provisional results of the poll. So, under the circumstances, it was up to the Interior Ministry to assume the duties of the CEN and declare the provisional results.
Hardly had this begun, than the Interior Minister noticed that there was a preponderance of results in favour of the Opposition. He then began to intercept the regional electoral commission reports, and issued press releases declaring a likely victory for Eyadéma. Warned by a member of the Opposition about what was going on, the Constitutional Court declared the Interior Minister to have broken the law. But the Minister said he had to take this unusual action as the CEN had ceased to function.
It was clear that Togo's Electoral Law had been broken. So, basing itself on its observers' reports, the European Union (EU) suspended its cooperation with Lomé. Even the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries (ACP) felt they had been duped by Eyadéma. He had actually signed agreements with his backers, to set up permanent structures for the correct running of elections. After pocketing the money, he immediately circumvented these structures. It should be noted that even before the CEN had been rendered ineffective by the mass resignations, the EU-trained local observers were made to feel their position was untenable and ineffective.
The EU's sanction against Togo hit the government hard as they thought they could get away with it. Obviously then, something had to be done fast to rectify the situation. So, a short time before leaving for the Franco-African conference in Paris, the government suggested a meeting with the Opposition. The Opposition responded favourably to this invitation, in the hope of reducing the political malaise by peaceful means. Eyadéma was then able to attend the Paris conference, blessed by his opponents' approval.
The first meeting Eyadéma had with the Opposition, allowed them to reach an agreement on the choice of those who would help in the negotiations. These "facilitators" represented France, Germany, the EU and the French-speaking group of countries (Francophonie). The Opposition thought that acceptance of dialogue by all parties would naturally mean that negotiations would take priority before anything else. Hence, they were really surprised when parliamentary elections were called for 21 March 1999. The various opposition parties and political groupings agreed to have nothing to do with any electoral campaign, which left the way open for the presidential party. This time, because they had a virtually clear field, Eyadéma and his party had no need to pressurise their nominees on the newly-formed CEN with its president to resign (if such had been the case on the previous occasion).
The Opposition then said they would boycott the election.
In a joint letter, the international "facilitators" had expressed their reservations about the wisdom of arranging general elections before finding solutions to all the problems threatening peace in Togo. Holding elections would only complicate their mission.
Similarly, Michel Rocard, former Prime Minister of France, on the eve of the elections, made an unsuccessful last-ditch attempt to persuade Eyadéma and his associates to change their minds. But look at the situation at the time of the elections - Eyadéma and his buddies had everything in their favour, including a repressive state structure backed up by the army and the militia. They knew the Opposition's only hope was to call on the international community, especially the EU, which although irritating, could have no effect on the presidential party's chosen course of action.
Luck was on Eyadéma's side: the EU Commission resigned. Jubilation in the presidential palace in expectation that the new Commission would have a more "friendly" attitude towards cooperation with Africa. This possibility has encouraged the presidential camp to multiply its visits to its influential friends, asking them to put in a good word with the EU.
Their arguments are simple: "We don't understand why greater demands are made on Togo than on other countries. It's a fact that in Africa, it is general practice that once election results are published, they are immediately challenged by the losers. Everyone must reach democracy at their own pace. You only achieved it after 200 years, yet you expect us to do it in 30 years".
Those who believe that Ibrahim Baré Maďnassara's assassination was a warning to others can stop worrying. The Togolese people are peace loving. The economic crisis, whose tragic consequences have been anticipated for the past ten years, far from driving them to revolt, is causing them to seek palliatives for their misery. Business is as usual: the banks, whose liquidation was predicted, remain open; workers prefer to have their salary payments arrive a few months late than not at all because they have lost their jobs!
The Arab States are prepared to divert some of their oil surpluses to Togo. Eyadéma has indicated by both covert and open approaches, that he's prepared to turn his country into an Islamic republic, applying to the Conference of Islamic States to which Togo has been recently admitted. He thus hopes to acquire financial resources which would relieve the pressure caused by the reduction in European aid. Neither economic crises, nor bombs, can overcome a dictator.
END
CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
PeaceLink 1999 - Reproduction authorised, with usual acknowledgement