CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by Adovi J.B. Adotevi, Lome, August 1999
THEME = POLITICS
Is Togo on the path to reconciliation?
Discussions among the Togolese people started on 19 July and led to an outline Agreement which was signed on 29 July by representatives from all Togo's main political parties. Most opposition politicians agreed to the conclusions contained in the document, especially those clauses ratifying the 1998 election results which returned General Eyadema to power. On and off, Eyadema has held power for about thirty years. However, one party, the Union of Forces for Change (UFC), the main opposition group opposing the ruling Assembly of the Togolese People (RPT), still rejected the election results. (Editor's note: In spite of this, the UFC did sign the Agreement). As opposition politicians have banned violence as a modus operandi, the Agreement now remains the only acceptable peaceful means for reconciling the Togolese people.
Representatives from Germany, France, the European Union, and the Francophone countries chaired the negotiations. One thing is certain, if the Togolese had chaired the meeting themselves, it would have ended in failure. Their past history is such, that it would have been impossible for them to have sat down by themselves to discuss a political crisis that has battered the country's economy and social relations over the last ten years. That there was a crisis, had been first denied, then dodged and finally used to accuse each others' political enemies. The crisis' existence had finally became obvious when outside donors' interests vanished, and it became official when a number of countries suspended economic and financial cooperation with Togo.
By 1998, Togo was virtually broke, so on 20 November 1998, President Eyadema called the various interested parties together to thrash out ways and means of having a quiet and constructive dialogue. On 24 December 1998, the President's supporters and all the opposition parties agreed that some outsiders should help them in their efforts to restore confidence in the nation's resources. In response to a request from Togo, France appointed Mr. Bernard Stasi; Germany - Count Paul von Stulpnagel; the European Union - Mr. Georg Reich (Austrian); the Francophone countries - Mr. Mustapha Niasse (Senegalese). These people had all been in charge of Togolese affairs in their respective countries.
It often happens that outsiders are asked to help in finding a solution to a conflict. Success depends on: all parties concerned agreeing to accept the facilitator; the facilitator's influence on participants; the facilitator's practical knowledge.
As Togo's Opposition has banned violence from their action-plans, the international community is an essential ingredient in any peaceful dialogue - more specifically, the European Union which had maintained on-going relations with Togo within the framework of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries Cooperation (ACP). Also, for historical reasons, both France and Germany have maintained their interest in seeing how things progress in Togo. The facilitators very quickly showed they were able to cope with the situation.
Where was the meeting (scheduled to start on 19 July 1999) to take place? Eyadema, who in other circumstances was only too willing to travel far and wide in the search for a conflict to settle, refused to go abroad. The Opposition, knowing the poisoned atmosphere within Togo, were afraid the negotiator's safety was threatened. All but one of the negotiators - who suggested the meeting should take place at the French Embassy in Lomé - thought the most suitable place for such a meeting is Paris. The agenda also proved to be a problem and even after several working sessions, there seemed to be no way forward on this issue. The attempts at dialogue appeared doomed to failure but then the facilitators stepped in with what proved to be a compromise solution. A preliminary meeting in Paris would debate the security conditions, and another meeting, to be held in Lomé with an open-ended agenda, would discuss the remaining issues. All participants were prohibited from demonstrating during the time of negotiations, and the services of foreign liaison officers (a term preferred to that of "observers") were to be sought. They would be in charge of supervising the implementation of the appropriate security measures.
On 16 July 1999, while one of the facilitators had already arrived in Lome to check on the implementation of the security measures decided in Paris, the UFC called on its supporters to travel to Togo's border with Ghana in order to welcome the party's president, Gilchrist Olympio. The facilitator in question disapproved of the gathering and the Home Minister issued an order prohibiting it. Mr. Olympio arrived at the frontier, but when his party officials informed him about the measures that had been taken for his safety, he turned back.
At the end of the first week of negotiations, the facilitators urged Gilchrist Olympio to come to the meeting. They promised to send an escort of foreign liaison officers or alternatively, they would come to meet him at the border themselves. At that time they didn't know Olympio had matters in mind which were outside the set agenda. He wanted to have talks with President Eyadema about the dispute concerning the presidential election which, in his view, was a subject just for the two parties claiming victory. This way of doing things pleased nobody, least of all the representatives from Togo's political parties, including his allies. The ruling party rejected his request to meet Eyadema. The President, himself, said he was having nothing to do with Olympio on this issue, and so Olympio turned round and went back into exile.
Invited by his friend Eyadema, France's President Chirac arrived in Lome following a visit to Conakry, Guinea. Togo's politicians were divided on the usefulness of this visit. Some said it looked liked France was supporting Togo's "Rule of Terror" (condemned by Amnesty International). Others thought the visit could serve some purpose in present circumstances.
Having met Chirac, President Eyadema held a press conference and said he would dissolve Parliament (in conformity with the Constitution) and hold parliamentary elections in March 2000, and that he would not stand as a candidate in the year 2003 presidential elections. He also undertook not to amend the Constitution of the 4th Republic (so far, he's never cared for any Constitution!) which prohibits a President from serving more than two terms of Office.
President Chirac took the opportunity of a meeting with the opposition leaders (the UFC representatives were absent) to elaborate on this information. At a press conference a few hours before his departure, Chirac said it was the UFC's "own business" if they had refused to meet him and if they had not responded to the invitation to personally take part in the negotiations. Jacques Chirac described Amnesty International's report which condemned the widespread killing and repression after the June 1998 elections, as a "manipulation". He said that before issuing such a condemnation, Amnesty International should have waited for the conclusions of the international enquiry being carried out with the approval of the Togolese authorities. Some observers said Chirac's statement was what can best be described as a "necessary "clanger"". In other words, having convinced Eyadema that he had to step down and make changes in government possible, Chirac had to calm him down and pour oil on troubled waters especially as regards his international prestige.
Mr Stasi comments: "Eyadema's announcement that he will not change the Constitution, gave rise to enormous relief among the negotiators". The party leaders took good note of it, except for the UFC's president, Gilchrist Olympio, who wanted a presidential election immediately following the dissolution of Parliament.
Yes. To put up with Eyadema for another four years is a bit much! But is there any alternative? The people also feel relieved. While admitting that Olympio's argumentation is right, they want him to accept the compromise which will make an imminent threat of civil war less likely.
The Agreement marks out the way ahead up to 2003 and it will be monitored by a committee in which both the political parties and the facilitators will be represented.
What's in the Agreement? Among the first items are: a respect for the Constitution; establishing appropriate means for ensuring there can be a changeover of political power in the country. An independent National Electoral Commission has been set up with a view to organising democratic and open elections. Decisions have also been taken concerning: The voting rights of former political leaders; determining the status of opposition parties; drawing up a Code of Conduct. The Media, both independent and state-run are asked to abide by the ethics of their profession; also, grants will be made available for the Media and for staff- training. Security measures are to be taken so as to allow refugees to return home. Finally, all those in the public eye are asked to conduct themselves in such a manner so as to restore Togo's image abroad.
Togo's poverty-stricken population leave themselves in the hands of God. They find comfort in the Bible and are convinced that God looks after them. Perhaps that's the case.
END
CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
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