CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by Louis Kalonji, Congo (RDC), August 1999
THEME = POLITICS
Kinshasa's view of the ceasefire agreement, a few days after it
was signed in July.
but we think the reactions of people in Congo RDC to the ceasefire agreement
will interest our readers
Saturday 10 July 1999 was a historic day for Congo RDC. On this day, in Lusaka, Zambia's capital, the Heads of State of those countries involved in the Congo war, namely, Congo RDC, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Rwanda and Uganda, signed a ceasefire agreement, in the presence of representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). However, the rebel leaders refused to sign the peace agreement, because of internal disagreements. The rebels' continuation of the war, undermines the Agreement, which may therefore be just a dead letter, and this would increase the state of insecurity within the RDC and in other Great Lakes countries, with their millions of refugees and displaced persons, who, therefore, cannot return home.
How have the Congolese people received the Lusaka Agreement? What were the rebels' reasons for refusing to sign, and what can now be done to secure a durable peace in the Congo?
The Agreement covers cessation of hostilities, disarmament of armed factions and inter-Congolese dialogue. The Agreement states that hostilities must end 24 hours after it is signed (in other words, the war must end on 11 July 1999).
A week later, a joint Military Commission (CMC) shall be set up, responsible for monitoring the ceasefire. A ministerial summit should therefore have taken place in Lusaka on 19 July, but it was delayed. The joint Military Commission shall consist of representatives from the warring parties, and observers from the UN and OAU, each party appointing 12 of its officers to take part in the Commission, which is chaired by an officer from a neutral army (an Algerian officer was appointed). The Agreement states that the CMC is responsible for identifying unofficial militias, disarming them and repatriating them. The Agreement gives examples of these militias: Interahamwe and ex-FAR soldiers in Rwanda; the five Ugandan guerrilla organisations; Burundi's Democratic Defence Forces (FDD); elements of UNITA in Angola, and other non-specific forces, with which the Maï-Maï in the Congo are associated.
The Commission is also authorised to arrest anyone found living on Congolese territory who took part in the Rwandan genocide. The Agreement also requires foreign troops to withdraw within six months of the date of signature of the agreement. During this period, the troops must remain where they were when the ceasefire was declared.
Two weeks after the ceasefire comes into effect, a neutral facilitator must be appointed for the inter-Congolese dialogue. Within three months, the Congolese must have concluded the agreement on formation of a single national army, consisting of the present regular army, plus those of the rebel forces. Firm, objective criteria have been drawn up to choose the military personnel who will form this new Congolese army. A certain educational standard is required, for example, which will exclude many of the uneducated, illiterate child soldiers (kadagos).
The Congolese people, who showed their joy at a return to peace, so essential for future development, enthusiastically welcomed the Lusaka Agreement. The misery exacerbated by the damaging effect of war, made ordinary people long for peace, and especially for a new political and institutional order in the country. The people, almost unanimously, condemn the refusal by rebel leaders to sign the Agreement. This attitude on the part of the rebel leaders is considered baffling and incomprehensible: because of their disagreement on a simple matter of form, they have prolonged the war. For this reason, the civil society, following an urgent meeting held in Kinshasa some days after the Lusaka agreement was signed, issued an urgent appeal to the rebel leaders to sign the ceasefire agreement without further delay. In turn, opposition leader Etienne Tshisekedi, supported this appeal.
Despite its satisfaction with the peace agreement, the population remains sceptical about the commitment of the aggressor countries, especially Rwanda, to comply with the settlement. Over and above the statements made by the rebel leaders, the statement of the Rwandan vice-president Paul Kagame, made to a Kenyan newspaper, doubting the chances of the Lusaka agreement in ending the war, must be taken seriously. Mr Kagame added that Rwanda could continue the war for years.
When all hopes were focused on Lusaka for bringing peace to the Congo, the RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) led by Dr. Emile Ilunga refused to sign the document instituting the ceasefire. Dr Ilunga, supported by Rwanda, excused himself by stating that he did not wish to be co-signatory with Mr Wamba dia Wamba, leader of another RCD faction controlled by Uganda.
However, the view in Kinshasa is, that the disagreements between rebels are only a front to allow Rwanda and Uganda to refuse to apply the ceasefire agreement, despite having signed it. Rwanda in particular, having seen the glimmer of hope for peace in the RDC, decided to cloud the issue by pretending to oppose the rebels. This meant that it would be sure of having the bill paid for its military support, by seizing the Mbuji-Mayi diamonds, which it can exploit for a period of time. This explains the obstacles deliberately created by the rebels, and cleverly supported by Rwanda and Uganda.
Signing the Lusaka ceasefire agreement was an important stage in restoring peace to the Congo. Subsequent stages, allowing this peace to be consolidated are specifically: the National Debate, or inter-Congolese dialogue; the establishment of transitional institutions; setting dates for elections and installation of the authorities for the 3rd Republic. The Agreement requires the inter-Congolese dialogue to involve the members of the existing government, representatives of the rebels, representatives of the internal democratic opposition, and other interested parties, such as religious denominations, unions, and other organisations in civil society. This dialogue will be used to initiate a draft Constitution and an electoral timetable. Establishment of transitional institutions will also be studied during this dialogue.
The armed opposition has already suggested taking over the army and the vice-presidency of the Republic. The rebels have also suggested entrusting finance, the interior ministry and the police to the unarmed opposition party and to civil society. As for election dates, the rebels have demanded that the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister should not be allowed to put themselves forward for election during the transitional period, so that they are not seen as both judge and jury.
For its part, the civil society wishes to play an active part in every one of the stages in the peace process. This has been made clear at the Workshop organised recently in Kinshasa by the International Foundation for Electoral Processes (IFES) with some participants from the civil society, led by Professor Tessy Bakary, from Côte d'Ivoire. While expressing its regret at not being present for the signing of the agreement in Lusaka, the civil society is determined to play a determining part in the next stages, leading to the introduction of a lasting peace and the emergence of a constitutional state in Congo RDC.
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PeaceLink 1999 - Reproduction authorised, with usual acknowledgement