CONTENTS | ANB-BIA HOMEPAGE | WEEKLY NEWS
by G. Mfuranzima, Burundi, January 2000
THEME = CIVIL WAR
Challenges facing the new mediator in a complicated peace process
Since June 1998, peace negotiations on Burundi have been taking place in Arusha, a town in Northern Tanzania. Representatives from most of Burundi's political parties are present. Burundians know all about Arusha - the International Tribunal for Rwanda has its headquarters there; and Rwanda's peace negotiations took place there in 1993, the conclusions of which were smashed to pieces by the July 1994 war. Politics in Rwanda have repercussions on politics in Burundi and vice-versa, so Burundians are watching very carefully what's going on in Arusha.
The army led by Major Pierre Buyoya, seized power for the second time on 25 July 1996. The country's political leaders then promised to have a dialogue with all the various protagonists in Burundi's internal conflicts, and with all those interested in the life of the nation. However, some people were adamant that the regime should not sit at the same table as those described as "leaders of armed gangs" or "people who had taken part in the genocide" - both being official terminology in Burundi to designate the military and political groups who have taken up arms to combat Major Buyoya's regime. i.e. The National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) under the leadership of former Home Minister Leonard Nyangoma; the Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People (Palipehutu); the National Liberation Front (Frolina).
Following pressure from the international community, especially from neighbouring countries which imposed a strict embargo on Burundi (from July 1996 to January 1999), Major Buyoya at first accepted to take part in secret talks in Rome under the auspices of the Catholic Community of San Egidio, together with Leonard Nyangoma's CNDD (the main opposition group). When, at the end of May 1997, the first draft of an agreement was signed, on the basis of which, both parties would continue to work for peace, some politicians at home cried "scandal" and "treason".
In the meantime, the Burundi government organised an important internal debate with the unarmed opposition, which resulted in the National Assembly approving a transitional constitution to bring about institutional change. In other words, a protocol between a National Assembly which had been elected in June 1993 and which was now reaching the end of its mandate, and an unpopular government resulting from the 25 July 1996 coup d'etat. The protocol clearly stated its intention of including Burundians living abroad, and accepted to open negotiations with representatives from all political parties and groupings, including those who had chosen to take up arms as a means of achieving their aims.
In addition to the CNDD, sixteen other political groups were invited to sit at the negotiating table in Arusha, under the mediation of the former President of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere. For Major Buyoya's government, this was the only possibility of finding a solution to the present conflict, as his armed forces were proving militarily incapable of winning the civil war. Most Burundians agreed with the "armed gangs"' call for more democracy, more respect for human rights, more opportunities for freedom of expression and opinion, a fair share in government, and adequate representation within national institutions and the armed forces.
Right from the start, consensus was reached in Arusha that any peace agreement must cover five areas, albeit, of extreme sensitivity within Burundi: The nature of the Burundian conflict; the genocide; the constitutional and institutional systems; democracy and fair governance; peace and security for all; economic and social development. Five commissions were established in order to speed up negotiations. Today, the talks have progressed, even if there are some points where total agreement has yet to be reached.
In short, all agree that the conflict in Burundi is a political one, but with an important ethnic aspect. Since Burundi's independence in 1962, several political crises have shaken the country (1961, 1965, 1972, 1988, 1993), with thousands of deaths simply because the victims belonged to another ethnic group. That's why several delegations in Arusha talk about a "genocide", but with no agreement being reached as to who perpetrated the genocide. Clarification on this point has been entrusted to an international commission of enquiry, which is looking into the various massacres which have taken place in Burundi since independence.
Looking at the way Burundi should be governed, and the institutions of government, everybody agrees (except for a pro- royalist party) that Burundi should remain a Republic, with a limitation put on the length of the time a President can remain in office, and the number of mandates he can serve. The length of mandate depends on which political party one belongs to. Everybody's concerned with the question of peace and security. The defense and security forces are considered from different angles - the Hutus, who numerically are in the majority say there's only Tutsis in the country's security forces, whereas the Tutsis, who are in the minority, say the security forces are their last line of defence.
Within Burundi, people are wondering what's going on at Arusha. The armed wings of the CNDD and Palipehutu had not been invited (during 1999) to take part in the negotiations, whereas they're the very ones who are waging war against Burundi's security forces. Maybe they weren't invited because they're considered to be "dissidents" from the mainstream parties. Also, some people are not happy with the progress of the talks. The Rally for Democracy and Economic Development (RADDES) persists in saying that it's neither useful nor necessary to undertake peace negotiations abroad. The party leaders consider that Burundi has enough valuable men at home who capable of mediating in the present conflict, even if it is a bloody affair.
Others say it is a national shame to have called on Julius Nyerere to mediate in Burundi's conflict, as Nyerere, with his concept of "African Socialism" had failed to find a solution to his own country's economic problems. Indeed, he only succeeded in leading his people into starvation. They had no regrets when Nyerere, considered by many to be a charismatic leader and one of the fathers of African independence, died. They hadn't much good to say about his method of work. He was accused of being prejudiced, "anti-governmental" and lending support to armed rebellion. "And", they said, "Tanzania offers shelter to refugees from Burundi, among whom are recruited the armed gangs that regularly attack Burundi".
On 1 December 1999, at a regional summit of African heads of States from Central and East Africa, South Africa's former President, Nelson Mandela, was appointed the new mediator in the Burundi conflict. He got off to a good start. He confirmed that peace negotiations would resume in Arusha in February 2000. He takes over from the late Julius Nyerere who had been unable, in September 1999, to contain his outrage at the Burundi negotiators who "used up the international community's patience and money". Julius Nyerere couldn't bring his efforts to a successful conclusion, even if he was the most likely among all heads of states of the Great Lakes region, to understand best the nature of the conflict in Burundi. He liked to say that he knew Burundians well, as he had worked with Prince Louis Rwagasore, the father of Burundi's independence, in finding ways and means of achieving independence.
Nelson Mandela will have to face two major problems: End the war and convince the warlords who so far had not been invited to Arusha, to sit among the other negotiators. Julius Nyerere had failed to achieve this. Nelson Mandela is a highly respected person in Burundi and in the world at large. It will be extremely difficult to oppose him, all the more so, as his own country, South Africa, has the military strength to influence the Burundian protagonists.
Nelson Mandela's stubbornness is also to be stressed. He will not accept solutions dictated to him by Europeans or Americans vis à vis Burundi. He holds a winning card: Burundians are tired of a war that has lasted far too long and which has undermined the national economy. Everybody, today, is looking forward to an end to the war - except, perhaps, those so-called "negotiators" who have been able to profit from a war economy, i.e. arms traffickers and drug dealers.
There is a problem. Nelson Mandela is no longer a young man. At the age of 82, he wanted to step back from politics and hand over South Africa's affairs of state to his successor, Thabo Mbeki. And there we are. He's been called out of retirement to mediate in a complicated conflict. Will he be able to get Burundians to agree to: A democratic system of government; a transition period leading to free, fair and democratic elections? Will he be able to impose a ceasefire on the warring factions? Will he be able to convince Burundi's politicians that the defence and security forces must be reorganised? These are the major challenges facing the new mediator. All are hoping that Nelson Mandela will be able to achieve what Julius Nyerere was unable to achieve - the signing of a peace agreement in the early months of the year 2000.
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