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CIVIL WAR
Governor Bilusa is fully aware that the Death Squad, coming from Kigali and Goma, is coordinating a «killing-fields» operation in Kisangani A local journalist describes and analyses the tragic events which took place in Kisangani, 14-15 May 2002
Tuesday 14 May and Wednesday 15 May 2002 were tragic times for Kisangani — once again, blood flowed freely in the streets. From 5 A.M., at the very moment when Kisangani’s citizens were preparing to get up, firing from automatic weapons was heard. But nobody knew who was doing the shooting and why?
7 o’clock struck and explanations were forthcoming. A soldier from the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in Kisangani who seemed to be in charge of about thirty «mutineers», invaded the National Radio-TV studios, and vented his anger against the RCD into the microphone. He was furious that the RCD had refused to sign the Sun City Agreement, which had been drawn up between Congo-Kinshasa’s government, and Jean-Pierre Mbemba’s Congolese Freedom Movement (MLC). The soldier called on everyone, including the governor of the province, the city’s mayor and the United Nations Mission in Congo (MONUC), to go down onto the streets to help him drive out the Rwandans who were responsible for all the ills afflicting the Congolese people.
Everyone was called upon to act.
The people seemed to be waiting for just such an opportunity. Off they went to hunt down the Rwandans, both military and civilians. Ever since the UN Security Council’s decision that Kisangani must be demiliterised and that all foreign troops must leave Congo RDC, the Rwandans had taken to keeping a low profile and going around in «civvies». The Lengemea Building, where Tele-Boyoma is installed, was the «mutineers» first target, for that’s the main Rwandan stronghold. The first casualty was a civilian. The second — a soldier — was hit near the Congo Palace Hotel. The third, also a soldier, was killed in front of the Mangobo town hall. Ever since the beginning of the wars in 1996, Congo’s been no stranger to such violence.
Reactions
But, already by 8 o’clock, the situation had changed. Firing was heard from the radio studio. The acting commander of the 7th Brigade, Mr. Ivon, came on air and announced he’d just crushed the mutiny, and asked all soldiers and police officers to come to his headquarters. The civilians were advised to throw down their arms and go home, otherwise they’d be immediately arrested. The «rebellion» was thus crushed in its infancy.
At 11 A.M. the Governor of the Eastern Province, Jean-Pierre Bilusa Baila, also came on the radio to express his disapproval and his anger against the attempted «coup», which was intended to eliminate both himself and «his» Rwandans. He blamed civil society and the students for what had taken place. He said they were the one’s who had encouraged the soldiers and the population to hate the Rwandans. And Bilusa added: «People just imagine that there’s Rwandans in Kisangani». He prohibited organisations from meeting until further notice.
Abisa Bokanga is chairman of the civil society grouping in the Eastern Province. He’d just come back to Kisangani from Sun City, South Africa, where he’d signed the Agreement between the Kinshasa government and the MLC. Governor Bilusa had returned the previous day from Goma, the RCD‘s capital, where he’d probably received the following instructions: 1) To prohibit Abisa Bokanga from describing what took place at the Sun City Inter-Congolese Dialogue; 2) To refuse to hold the International Symposium For Peace in Africa, which had been scheduled for 23-26 May 2002, and which had been organized by the Churches and the civil society; 3) To refuse to demilitarise Kisangani. (The UN Security Council’s decision on this issue had just been made public).
Keeping in mind that Rwanda supports the RCD, Laurent Kunda (a Tutsi), the 7th Brigade’s commanding officer, and Commander Gabriel Amisi Tango, the RCD‘s army chief-of staff quickly returned to Kisangani. They’d brought with them an elite commando unit coming from Kigali (Rwanda), via Goma.
Witch-hunt
And then the witch-hunt began. The commandos had set their sights on Mangobo municipality, where Governor Bilusa had grown up and lived. In Mangobo, there’s an organisation called «Bana Etats-Unis» which is fully prepared to ally itself to any kind of popular resistance movement. «Bana Etats-Unis» had the misfortune to be asked by the «mutineers» to join in their «uprising». All Tuesday afternoon; during the night; and on Wednesday morning, there were scenes of carnage in Mangobo, especially around Christ The King Parish. There was a never-ending succession of looting, robbing, rape, murder.
The parish plant was ransacked; the parish priest, Father «Zabalo», was beaten and then kidnapped; his curate, Father Verhagen was beaten so badly he had to be hospitalized. More than 100 people were killed, including soldiers and police mutineers; soldiers and policemen sent to ferret out the «mutineers» and who were, in their turn, quietly eliminated so they wouldn’t spill the beans about what they’d done; soldiers and policemen who turned themselves in when asked to do so by the local RCD authorities; police officers being trained at Kapalata Camp for future work with MONUC; police officers based at Mituku Camp; civilians living in Mangobo. Abisa Bokanga knew he was in danger and so went into hiding.
Many of Mangobo’s young people were targeted by the commandos and took to the bush beyond the River Tshopo; others sheltered on the Kisangani University campus.
Analysis
What should we make of these dramatic events? Was there really a mutiny, or a simple cover-up. Let’s take a closer look at the various statements made by people familiar with the situation.
When the soldier «mutineer» spoke into the RTNC‘s microphone, he described the situation as an «uprising against the Rwandan army».
It was the acting 7th Brigade commander who called them, «mutineers», but only after he’d re-occupied the studio.
Governor Bilusa said civil society and the students were responsible for what had taken place. They were the ones, he said, who had encouraged the civilians and the soldiers to revolt. He even went so far as to suspend all civil society activities, and, at the same time, made it clear he would not intervene to save any arrested person.
Lawyer Moise Nyarugabo holds the portfolio of the Justice Department and is at the same time, acting President and Secretary-General of RCD-Goma. He blames the «insurrection» on the government of Kinshasa.
Dr. Lola Kisanga directs the RCD‘s Communications Department and is the RCD‘s acting spokesperson. He doesn’t see a mutiny in this business — rather, the troublemakers are deserters from the RCD‘s armed forces, come to sow mayhem within RCD ranks.
Olivier Kamitatu is the MLC‘s secretary-general. (The MLC is a rebel movement led by Jean-Pierre Mbemba and is supported by Uganda). He says the government of Kinshasa and the MLC had nothing to do with events in Kisangani. What took place there is clear proof that the RCD can’t control its own troops. Civilian and military uprisings will soon become frequent in areas occupied by the RCD, for everyone wants the RCD to sign the outline agreement signed by the Kinshasa government and the MLC.
Mr. Dismas Kitenge is chairperson of the Lotus Group, an NGO in Kisangani for the defense of human rights. He says the whole episode was a put-up job to muzzle civil society. Why? Because the Lotus group was on the point of publicizing what took place at Sun City; it was endeavouring to ensure that the decision to demilitarize Kisangani, becomes effective; it was working with the Churches to prepare an International Symposium for Peace in Africa.
Theories
I’ve got several theories about what happened:
- 1 - That it was a real mutiny by disaffected elements in the RCD. This is confirmed by the soldier who shouted into the RTNC‘s microphone: «We’re taking this step because the Rwandans are dominating the RCD and our leaders are doing nothing to change the situation». The fact that not all the soldiers and police officers were informed about the attempted «coup», could be construed as yet another proof of mutiny. The mutineers undoubtedly feared they would be betrayed or information about their proposed action would leak out. Other facts which could corroborate the «mutiny theory»: All Congolese are obviously fed up with this second rebellion and want to do something to bring peace and unity to their country. Moreover, they now realize that it’s Congo’s rebel leaders, both civilian and military, who’ve led them into error. This present war is just one more example of Tutsis from Congo RDC and Rwanda, and of foreign armies, destroying their country piecemeal. So, something must be done about it.
- 2 - That it was a «put-up job» masterminded by RCD-Goma for its own ends — giving it a reason to virtually silence all opposition. Already, for a number of days, there had been rumours going the rounds about an attempt to sabotage the International Symposium for Peace. Nothing astonishing in this supposition, bearing in mind that Governor Bilusa’s first radio statement was an accusation against civil society. The students were also quickly accused for reasons unknown. Maybe, also, this was a way to silence Mr Abisa on his return from Sun City, and his declared intention of letting all and sundry know about what had taken place there. The Governor would have regarded that as a challenge. The previous day, Mr Abisa had given an interview on Radio OKAPI — an interview during which he gave his point of view regarding the Sun City Agreement, and his declared intention of working for Inter-Congolese Dialogue. Governor Bilusa was none to happy with this interview!
- 3 - That it was an attempt by the RCD to create a situation, whereby MONUC‘s work of training selected police officers for future security duties in Kisangani, following the demilitarization resolution taken by the UN Security Council (Resolution Number 1304), would be sabotaged.
My opinion
If it were a real mutiny, then why weren’t the mutineers, who had been surrounded for more than an hour by soldiers loyal to the RCD, not arrested but only dispersed by shots fired in the air? At the same time, why were the army officers and police officers who first appeared on the scene to block the action of the so-called mutineers, the ones to be arrested. (But what’s happened to them?)
If it was a «put-up job» to silence the Opposition, then did Governor Bilusa realise his mistake in organising an operation in which people would be killed? Did he really think he’d get away with it — that the Congolese people and the international community would leave such a crime unpunished?
The question is: Who was responsible for what took place? I think there was a shared responsibility by:
- The soldiers who stayed loyal to the RCD and Bilusa? Yet the problem remains — In realising that the well-being of their country is a treasure beyond price, it is inconceivable that they would continue to follow their leaders blindly while foreign armies are plundering and killing their peaceful fellow-citizens.
- The civilian population who took to the streets to hunt down the Rwandans? Yet the people must have realised that armed with knives and cutlasses, they wouldn’t get far against modern weaponry.
- In the long run, I think the main responsibility must lie with Governor Bilusa. He’s ultimately to blame for all the blood shed in Kisangani, both Rwandan and Congolese. Was what happened really necessary?
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PeaceLink 2002 - Reproduction authorised, with usual acknowledgement