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Côte d’Ivoire |
CIVIL WAR
500...1,000...2,000 killed? It’s difficult to assess what’s really happened
since 19 September when the first shots in the current conflict were fired.
But it’s important to understand the main reasons why Côte d’Ivoire
— once considered an «oasis of peace» in war-torn Africa, is now tearing itself apart«Coup d’etat», «putsch», «mutiny», «mutineers», «revolution», «uprising», «rebels», «shooting», «curfew», «state of emergency»...ever since 1999, the vocabulary of the ordinary citizen accustomed to living in peace, has been «enriched» by decidedly war-like expressions — words which express the violence taking place around them. A far cry from President Houphouët-Boigny’s affirmation that «blood will never run on Côte d’Ivoire’s soil!» Today, the country is awash with the blood of its citizens, many of whom are getting more and more blood-drunk! Côte d’Ivoire’s population have now reached rock-bottom as far as relations between themselves are concerned. How‘s it possible when peace had become a way of life, almost a «second religion» (another of President Houphouët-Boigny’s «credos»)? What’s the reason for the current crisis which has broken out so soon after the National Reconciliation Forum (October to December 2001) and the setting-up of a broad-based government. A government which included the main political parties: The Democratic Party of Côte d’Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA), founded in 1946 by President Houphouët-Boigny, later led by former President Henri Konan Bédié, Côte d’Ivoire’s president until ejected in the 1999 coup d’etat; plus the Rally of the Republicans — the party of President Houphouët-Boigny’s former prime minister, Mr. Alassane Dramane Ouattara, («Ado» to his fans).
From the economic point of view, hope for the country’s future was reborn by normalizing relations with the international community, especially with Côte d’Ivoire’s financial backers — the Bretton Woods Institutions and the European Union, both of which had resumed their financial co-operation with Côte d’Ivoire.
The provincial elections gave another reason for hope, providing the basis for decentralisation — considered to be the way of achieving any nation’s development.
The various crises which have beset Côte d’Ivoire in recent years, can be explained by the way in which the successors to the charismatic Felix Houphouët-Boigny, the father of independence, who died in December 1999, took Office. In Côte d’Ivoire, when a President dies in Office, Article 11 of the Constitution stipulates that Parliament’s Speaker takes over. But that did not prevent a «war of succession» between the various «heirs to the throne», in particular between Mr. Henri Konan Bédié, the «constitutional successor», and Prime Minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara.
A number of senior PDCI-RDA officials were not too enamoured with Mr. Bédié, so with their support, Alassane Ouattara embarked on a behind-the-scenes campaign for the presidency. Signs of this campaign were: The foundation of the RDR (a breakaway group from the PDCI-RDA; rumours in 1995 of a (failed) attempt by General Robert Guéi to seize power; a boycott by the main opposition parties of the 1995 elections, during which there were several deaths.
«Houphouetism»’s three trends
President Bédié counter-attacked by concocting a «nationalist» electoral law, barring former Prime Minister Ouattara from the presidency because his parents were said to come from neighbouring Burkina Faso. This gave birth to the concept of «Ivoirité» (Ivorianness), often badly explained as Bédié’s attempts to exclude a competitor from office. However, the origin of this word is more complex because it’s all to do with political warfare between a number of presidential hopefuls who had no intention of granting any favours to rivals!
The 24 December 1999 coup d’etat (in which General Guéi took power) was thus regarded as the result of all the quarrelling among Houphouët’s heirs, revealing three main trends in Houphouët-Boigny’s legacy to the nation (i.e. «Houphouétism»):
- Henri Konan Bédié’s nationalist form of «Houphouétism» —an awakening to Côte d’Ivoire’s national aspirations;
- Laurent Dona-Fologo’s brand of «Houphouétism». He was the PDCI-RDA‘s former secretary-general and preached: «no diverting from what Houphouët-Boigny taught us»;
- Alassane Dramane Ouattara wants to keep Houphouët-Boigny’s more open ideas. But don’t forget that Ouattara introduced residence permits into Côte d’Ivoire — thus creating a distinction between Ivoirien nationals and foreigners.
General Guéi claimed to follow some trend of «Houphouétism», but didn’t have a clearly defined position — sometimes allied with «Ado» against Bédié; sometimes closing ranks with Bédié against «Ado», depending on his immediate interests! Guéi did his best to prevent «Ado» from standing in the October 2000 presidential elections because of «Ado»’s «doubtful nationality status». Following these elections when he failed to get elected, Guéi became «Ado»’s main ally!
Who stands accused?
Côte d’Ivoire’s new rulers are adamant that Guéi and «Ado» are mainly responsible for the present violence. But it’s difficult to prove the accusation. Guéi was assassinated by forces loyal to the government; «Ado»’s residence was plundered and set on fire and his aide-de-camp was murdered.
The 1999 coup d’etat was caused by quarrels between presidential hopefuls — and those who ultimately came off best in this coup, Laurent Gbagbo and General Guéi, are mainly responsible for events connected with the 19 September 2002 and afterwards.
During the mixed military-civilian transition period which followed the 1999 coup, Gbagbo and Guéi did their best to ensure their own succession to high office by excluding other potential candidates — especially those from the PDCI-RDA and the RDR. The aim of this «deal» being to ensure that their future government would have its power-base in the west, with Guéi as President and Gbagbo as Prime Minister. But following the presidential elections, Gbagbo proclaimed himself President. For Guéi this was nothing short of treason! Guéi’s death on 19 September can thus be interpreted as the two men settling accounts — with Gbagbo the winner!
Gbagbo, the common enemy
Alassane Ouattara, the RDR‘s leader, was convinced that Laurent Gbagbo had kept him out of power, and he did everything possible to convince General Guéi that such was the situation. He was also convinced that Gbagbo had done his best to prevent PDCI-RDA candidates from being elected. So, before the 19 September, everyone talked about a «union among the “houphouétists”».
That’s to say, with the exception of Bédié, who still hadn’t managed to digest being kicked out of power by General Guéi, and who still hesitated which way to turn. This perhaps has saved him from being troubled by the authorities in the present crisis.
Ouattara is convinced that he should be governing the country, especially after his victory in the local elections — in no way should Laurent Gbagbo’s Ivoirien Popular Front, (FPI), a minority party, be in power.
Ouattara says there should be a re-run of at least the parliamentary elections (10 December 2000) from which the RDR was excluded, to oblige President Gbagbo to resign or at least to accept a situation of coexistence between President and the opposition parliamentary majority. His intention would be to force through an amended Constitution, even if the present Constitution had been voted (23 July 2000) in by 86.56% of those who voted. In its present form, the Constitution is indeed unfavourable to «Ado» whose nationality remains «doubtful»! While the RDR still formed part of the government of national unity, there didn’t seem much point in disputing the election results, but now...?
And what about the soldiers?
And don’t let’s forget the military (mostly young soldiers), who, even more than the political leaders, have been carrying out the various coup d’etats and attempted coups. They’re the ones who carried out the 24 December 1999 military coup in which President Bédié was forced to flee from Côte d’Ivoire, and who eventually were left on the sidelines by General Guéi. Among those soldiers who felt they’d been tricked or even betrayed by the General and who had to go into exile to escape the General’s clutches, there’s Sergeant Ibrahim Diarrassouba (also called «IB». Sergeant Boka Yapi, the «terror of the transition period», on the other hand, was one of General Guéi’s most faithful followers, but when his master was defeated in the October 2000 presidential elections, he had to go into exile to escape the popular anger.
Of course, there’s also some other young and dangerous soldiers, such as a certain Tuo Fozié who has just made his presence known in this present crisis.
These young soldiers generally support «Ado» and they’ve only one idea in their heads: to repeat the 1999 coup d’etat so as to get «their man» into power. For them, «Côte d’Ivoire’s revolution will remain unfinished as long as all the nation’s political leaders haven’t had a chance to stand in the presidential elections».
One of the fundamental reasons for the frequent coups d’etat in Côte d’Ivoire is because of divisions within the armed forces. Also, the soldiers have sided with the politicians and allowed themselves to be manipulated by the political leaders. Everyone points the finger at «Ado», who, ever since he first appeared on the political scene in 1989, has done everything possible to create problems.
Ivoirité. What’s it all about?
Let’s go back to the concept of «Ivoirité» because it’s one of the essential factors in the present conflict, as well as one of the reasons for divisions between northerners and southerners, Muslims and Christians, as well as between Ivorians and foreigners, especially the Burkinabé who are by far the most numerous among foreigners living in Côte d’Ivoire. There could be more than 4 million Burkinabé living in Côte d’Ivoire, which calls into question statistics provided by the 1998 census which speaks of about 2.5 million Burkinabé.
In 1995, President Bédié introduced what he called a policy of «Ivoirité» (or Ivorianess»), officially to cultivate a «national conscience» among his fellow citizens, but, which according to some, was to settle accounts with his main adversary, Alassane Ouattara. The policy had great success especially among politicians who frequently embraced it so as to get elected —with the exception of Alassane Ouattara. While not mentioning the word «Ivoirité», the socialist, Laurent Gbagbo, propagates «patriotism», «nationalism» and «Ivoirien uniqueness» — which amounts to the same thing!
26% of Côte d’Ivoire’s population are immigrants! This has created among Ivoirians the feeling of «being invaded», a feeling accentuated these days by the economic crisis, resulting in foreigners being made scapegoats. Any politician who says he’s keen to look after his constituents, feels obliged to adhere to the principles of Ivoirité.
Burkina Faso
Most Burkinabé immigrants are to be found on Côte d’Ivoire’s plantations either as labourers or owners. The 1998 Land Ownership Law was felt in Burkina Faso to be a means of expropriating Burkinabé-owned property in Côte d’Ivoire. Moreover, the on-going land disputes between Burkinabés and Ivorians are interpreted by the Burkina Faso government to be nothing short of a deliberate policy by the Ivoirien authorities to expel the Burkinabé peasants.
Many opposition leaders have had to go into exile to Burkina Faso and have found shelter there. Rumour has it that Burkina Faso welcomes them, provides them with training camps as a deliberate policy in order to destabilize Côte d’Ivoire. It would seem that Burkina’s intention is not to not to conquer Côte d’Ivoire, rather to see it lead by someone who has a sympathetic approach to his compatriots living abroad. Someone like Alassane Ouattara!
Is Burkina Faso responsible for what’s happening within Côte d’Ivoire these days? The Ivoirien authorities seem convinced of it, basing their certitude on the weapons used by the attackers: FN and M16AZ assault weapons; AMELI and RAW machine guns; Thomson-Brandt mortars and anti-tank devices; Mistral and Stinger ground-to-air missiles; other weapons such as the American Olin and British Enfield rifles. That’s to say, weapons which are not found in the Ivoirien army.
Moreover, the attackers seem to come from the north, i.e. from Mali or Burkina Faso, with a strong suspicion about Burkina because of the reasons just given.
But «the land of incorruptible men» (Burkina Faso), denies any involvement. Perhaps only an international investigation can enlighten us. However, an initial meeting in Côte d’Ivoire by Heads of State of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) talked about «rebellion», not «external aggression,» and referred to the current violence as being an internal matter for Côte d’Ivoire. For ECOWAS, the solution lies in dialogue between the warring parties and offers at most to mediate between the government and the soldiers who launched the military uprising. ECOWAS would also be prepared to provide a peacekeeping force.
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