Text:
http://www.mg.co.za/mg/news/97may1/6may-zairereport.html
The ghosts that
will haunt Kabila
What kind of leader will Laurent Kabila make? Two Africa experts from the US
military assess his chances -- and warn of the perils that lie ahead
Dr STEVEN METZ and Colonel DAN
HENK
ITHIN a few weeks, Laurent Kabila will probably lead a victorious rebel army
into Kinshasa, the capital of Zaire, thus ending Mobutu's long dictatorship.
This will set off immense celebration throughout the country and, for a time at
least, rekindle optimism about the future.
The next stage is more difficult to predict. Rather than beginning a time of healing, Kabila's ascent may exacerbate Zaire's many problems and simply be one more stage of an seemingly endless national journey into misery and despair.
Much depends on decisions made by the rebel leader. One key choice will be the political system of the new Zaire. So far, Kabila has not given a clear indication of his intentions. Although he has appointed a surprisingly diverse group to political positions in his movement, real power seems to rest with his military commanders.
The problem is that Mobutu prevented the emergence of strong, uncorrupt political leaders and administrators during his thirty-plus years of rule. Kabila might not be able to find enough such figures even if he wanted too. And, the rebel leader may choose to replicate Mobutu's method for holding power with its emphasis on nepotism and cronyism.
After holding elections and working with local officials in most of the areas captured by his forces, for instance, Kabila named Gaetan Kakudji, his cousin, governor of Shaba province. And he has insisted that he will hold power during an undetermined transitional period once Mobutu leaves.
Kabila's rejection of any major role for Etienne Tshisekedi in the post-Mobutu political system does not bode well for his tolerance of opposition or dispersion of political power. Tshisekedi led the opposition to Mobutu for the past seven years and is the second-most popular leader in Zaire after Kabila himself, particularly in Kinshasa and the Kasais. He could make trouble for Kabila if ignored and excluded after the rebel victory.
While often disliked elsewhere in Zaire, Tshisekedi's Luba-Kasai coethnics
represent a considerable economic power in Zaire and are heavily
represented among the nation's professionals. Once the war is over, Kabila may
also turn on the more powerful rebel leaders, sparking a round of purges.
The cohesion of the rebel alliance is based on its hatred of Mobutu, not its love of Kabila. This means that Kabila must exhibit extraordinary skill if he is to avoid internecine warfare after the old dictator is gone. Kabila's willingness or ability to control retribution against former Mobutu supporters after the rebel victory will also shape Zaire's future.
There is no doubt that such retribution will occur, but the question is how
extensive it will be. It may be limited to Mobutu's closest associates. But if
retribution spreads to the middle- and lower-level official of the old regime,
post-Mobutu
reconstruction will be difficult. So far, Kabila's administration in "liberated"
areas includes officials from the previous regime.
African history is replete with accounts of local chiefs who switch allegiance in recognition of new political realities. This is considered good sense, not moral failure. For Kabila, controlling retribution will be difficult since his most loyal supporters are Zaire's "have nots" who feel they have a right to seize the property of those who benefitted from the Mobutu system.
Kabila can, however, choose to control the extent of the retribution. As with
the death of Tito in Yugoslavia, Mobutu's demise may unleash
simmering hatred as various groups and cliques seek to repay old grievances or
scramble for power in the political chaos following the rebel victory.
Kabila might allow this in an attempt to weaken any potential challengers to his
own power, or prove unable to control it. Reports of atrocities against the Hutu
refugees remaining in eastern Zaire are particularly worrisome, leading U.N.
Secrentary-General Kofi Annan to accuse the rebel movement -- the ADFL -- of
"slow extermination."
The way Kabila chooses to approach Shaba province will be particularly important. This is Zaire's richest region and has sporadically manifested an interest in independence. Kabila, who is originally from Shaba, is aware of this and has made Lumumbashi, Shaba's major city, his capital.
But unless Kabila is able to provide the region's ambitious leaders with compelling and unambiguous evidence that they will be better off in post-Mobutu Zaire, Katanga is likely to attempt secession. Kabila could accept the loss of the region, thus complicating Zaire's economic recovery. He could pursue a diplomatic or negotiated solution, perhaps one leading to partial autonomy for Katanga.
Or, he could use force, possibly igniting another civil war. Since force propelled Kabila from obscurity to power in the last six months, his tendency will be to continue to rely on it. There are many unanswered questions about Laurent Kabila but what is known gives little sign of wisdom, vision, and a propensity for consensus in the mode of Nelson Mandela.
Because of this, the international community must carefully prod his decision making. In the broadest sense, Kabila must tolerate a loyal opposition, allow a dispersion of power, control ethnic conflict, and limit retribution against the administrators of the old system. He must be rewarded for prodding Zaire toward a system based on political inclusion, consensus-building, rule of law, civil rights, democracy, and free enterprise with minimal state involvement.
But the world community also must recognize that recovery will be a very long process. It will take years to build a genuine national civil society, to inculcate democratic values and construct functioning political parties, a free press, a fair and efficient judicial system, and graft-free political structures.
The Zairian economy and infrastructure are in such shambles that returning to the modest prosperity of two decades ago will be arduous. This is particularly true since disillusionment is likely once the initial euphoria associated with Mobutu's demise fades. People will expect a rapid improvement in their lives. When this does not happen, widespread frustration could allow a return to the conflict, repression, and corruption of the Mobutu era.
The United States and the world community must not be misled by a period of apparent stability and reform following Kabila's victory. Even if he makes all the right choices, it will be a very long time before the evils of the past can be fully purged.