From: mana@udayton.edu
To: "UD Student Ministry - Rwanda Project" <RWANDAHOPE@lists.udayton.edu>
Subject: Human Rights Watch reports on massive killings of Rwandan
Refugee
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 1997 10:27:52 -0400
Sender: Maiser@lists.udayton.edu
Mime-Version: 1.0
Status:
http://homepages.udayton.edu/~uwiringi/reports/hrw/congo1.htm#II.
Dear Friends:
This is surely one of the most extensive reports available so far, even
though a tiny portion of the Congo was covered.
Peace,
Leonard
I. SUMMARY
The Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and the Alliance of Democratic Forces
for
the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) carried out massive killings of
civilian refugees and other violations of basic principles of international
humanitarian law during attacks on refugee camps in the former Zaire
(now
the Democratic Republic of Congo) that began in late 1996, and in the
ensuing seven months as war spread across the country. The war pitted
the
ADFL, used here to mean all forces under the nominal command of
Laurent-Desir Kabila,(1) with important backing from Rwanda, Uganda,
Burundi, Angola and other neighboring states, against a coalition of
then
President Mobutu Sese Seko's Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ), former Rwandan
Armed Forces (ex-FAR), Rwandan Interahamwe militia, and mercenaries.
In
addition to overthrowing former Zairian President Mobutu, the RPA and
ADFL
sought to disperse the refugee camps in Eastern Zaire, home to hundreds
of
thousands of civilian refugees as well as the ex-FAR and Interahamwe.
Since
the beginning of the war in the former Zaire gross violations of
international humanitarian law have been committed by all parties to
the
conflict.
The nature and scale of abuses by different armed parties during the
war
varied significantly. The FAZ, ill-equipped and poorly motivated to
combat
the ADFL, were responsible along with their mercenary allies for countless
acts of looting, destruction, and rape, in addition to indiscriminate
bombings of Congolese populations resulting in numerous civilian casualties.
Prior to the war, the FAZ, Interahamwe and local militia had carried
out
attacks on civilian populations in the east, as part of a national
intimidation campaign against ethnic Tutsi Congolese.(2) The ex-FAR
and
Interahamwe militia supported their combat with and flight from the
ADFL and
its allies by widespread theft from Congolese communities and using
civilian
refugees as a shield. Ex-FAR and armed militia who had fled Rwanda
in the
wake of the genocide were responsible for sporadic killings of Congolese
and
reportedly some civilian refugees. Members of the ADFL military, in
particular its Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili-speaking elements, regular
troops
of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), and their allies were responsible
for
large-scale killings of civilian refugees from Rwanda throughout their
military advance across the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo). One
Rwandan officer who had been in charge of troops at several massacre
sights
in Congo commented, "It's so easy to kill someone; you just go--[pointing
his finger like a pistol]--and it's finished."
These killings represent the latest in a cycle of massive violations
of
international humanitarian and human rights law in the Great Lakes
Region in
which impunity for the perpetrators has been the rule. Human Rights
Watch/International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH) will
soon
publish a major account of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, including precursor
events and the entirely inadequate response of the international community.
Human Rights Watch/FIDH interviewed Congolese, refugees, international
humanitarian workers, and long-time foreign residents in several provinces
of Congo and the subregion during a six-week mission. Human Rights
Watch/FIDH visited an eighty-kilometer stretch of road in one region
of
Congo, far from areas where combat took place, along which civilian
refugees
were slaughtered by members of the ADFL and RPA. In this area, Human
Rights
Watch/FIDH photographed mass grave sites of refugees and areas of road
still
littered with their decomposed bodies, among which the remains of women
and
children were clearly identifiable. Many of the skulls seen and photographed
contained holes or were fractured, suggesting blows with a heavy object.
The
testimony of eyewitnesses describing how certain refugees were killed
corroborated with physical evidence on the site, such as smashed skulls
or
other physical trauma. The refugees in this particular area were killed
largely with machetes and knives by Kinyarwanda and Kiswahili-speaking
members of the ADFL and members of the RPA. Prior to the arrival of
the ADFL
and RPA to this area, the ex-FAR and armed Rwandan exiles operating
with
them were responsible for widespread theft, destruction and reportedly
some
killings of Congolese civilians.
The killings and violations of international humanitarian law in this
area
represent a cross-section of events that occurred throughout Congo.
Thousands of refugees, often young men, the sick, and those too weak
to flee
were killed by soldiers of the ADFL and RPA as they advanced across
Congo.
Thousands of other civilian refugees were deliberately cut off from
humanitarian assistance, resulting in thousands of deaths due to starvation,
dehydration, and disease. Many of the remains of refugees that were
killed
by the ADFL or the RPA have been exhumed, burned, or otherwise disposed
of
out of sight of potential witnesses. Congolese have been intimidated
to keep
them from providing information about the killings through arrests,
beatings, and killings of those who have dared to speak out. Killings
of
civilians from several ethnic groups continue in Congo, most notably
in the
east where the unresolved issues of land rights, citizenship, and customary
power have aggravated violence between remnants of the ex-FAR, Mobutu's
former Army (ex-FAZ), and other ethnic-based Congolese militia, all
aligned
against the troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army still garrisoning
the
region.
Some members of the international community, including the United States,
were aware of Rwanda's intention to attack refugee camps in Eastern
Zaire
well in advance and either supported the idea, were unable to propose
alternative solutions to the challenges posed by the camps, or did
nothing
to prevent it. After months of denial, Rwandan Vice-President Paul
Kagame in
early July 1997, claimed responsibility for planning and leading the
invasion of the former Zaire and explained that his objective of dispersing
refugees and destroying the ex-FAR and Interahamwe had been made known
to
officials of the United Nations and the United States among other members
of
the international community. The United States provided key political
support to the Rwandan authorities throughout the military campaign
in Congo
and up to the present; knowledgeable witnesses have claimed that U.S.
military provided training and assistance to the RPA on Congolese territory.
In April 1997, upon the recommendation of the United Nations special
rapporteur on Zaire, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights
requested
that an investigation be conducted into mass killings and other gross
violations of human rights in Congo. Since then, the Congolese government
has demanded changes in the mandate of the U.N. investigation and repeatedly
stalled the investigation. International support for the investigation
has
fluctuated: negotiations between Kabila and U.S. Ambassador Bill Richardson
and U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan led to a change in the head of
the
U.N. mission and its mandate; as of this writing, however, the United
Nations, European Union and United States have taken a firmer stand
on the
investigation taking place, insisting that international aid be conditioned
on cooperation with the U.N. mission. Key members of the Organization
of
African Unity (OAU) have been firm in their support of Kabila as he
defies
the U.N. investigation.
The Congolese and Rwandan governments, along with the international
community, should take all measures necessary to put an end to impunity
in
the region. This includes public recognition by all governments concerned
that massacres of civilians took place during the armed conflict in
Congo,
as well as insisting that war criminals are investigated and held
accountable for their acts. In parallel, efforts should be reinforced
to
bring the perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda to justice. The
international community should encourage the growth of Congolese
organizations of civil society and provide aid in key areas such as
health
and education through nongovernmental organizations, but condition
its other
non-humanitarian aid on full compliance and cooperation with the United
Nations Secretary-General's Investigative Mission and respect for
international human rights norms. International support for national
institutions of justice should be an urgent priority once the Congolese
government has fully cooperated with the U.N. Investigative Mission.
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
To the Government of the Democratic Republic of Congo
Suspend and investigate members of the ADFL suspected of involvement
in
civilian massacres and other violations of humanitarian law, and hold
individuals accountable for such abuses; members of the ADFL who obstructed
humanitarian assistance to civilian populations should be subject to
investigation, and prosecution where appropriate. ADFL officers and
troops
under investigation should be suspended from positions of authority
for the
duration of the investigation.
Publicly denounce deliberate killings of civilians in Congo by all
parties, including foreign military from Rwanda and other neighboring
states, during the seven-month war that brought the ADFL to power,
as well
as ongoing killings. Insist that those responsible are immediately
withdrawn
from the field and subject to investigation, and prosecution where
appropriate, either in Congo or their home country.
Protect refugees, internally displaced, and other civilian populations
from abuses committed by members of the former Rwandan Army (the ex-FAR,
Forces Armes Rwandaises), Interahamwe and other armed militia, and
FAZ; in
doing so, respect international humanitarian law and take all possible
measures to limit civilian and refugee casualties during military
operations.
Cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha
in
bringing those responsible for the 1994 Rwanda genocide to justice.
Allow the United Nations Secretary-General's Investigative Mission
unhampered access to all regions of Congo and ensure its security and
independence in accordance with its mandate. Instruct members of the
ADFL
and other military forces present in Congo to cease the destruction
of
evidence of civilian massacres and other abuses. Encourage the Congolese
population and ADFL military to cooperate with the U.N. mission and
ensure
the protection of those who provide information.
Cease its intimidation campaign against potential witnesses of civilian
massacres. Investigate human rights abuses committed by ADFL or other
military forces on Congolese territory against individuals suspected
of
collaboration with the U.N. Investigative Mission.
Guarantee the protection and assistance of refugees on Congolese territory
in accordance with international standards, including the right to
non-refoulement. Create the conditions necessary for the United Nations
High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to provide assistance and protection
to
refugees remaining in Congo.
Support the work of Congolese organizations of civil society, especially
those involved in the protection and promotion of human rights.
Establish national institutions to promote the rule of law and respect
for
human rights, in particular an independent judiciary and a permanent
human
rights commission.
Initiate training programs in basic principles of human rights and
international humanitarian law for members of the police, army, and
judiciary.
To the Government of Rwanda
Withdraw, suspend from active duty, and investigate Rwandan military
suspected of being involved in civilian massacres in Congo, and hold
individuals accountable for such abuses; members of the RPA who obstructed
humanitarian assistance to civilian populations should be subject to
investigation, and prosecution where appropriate.
Assist the U.N. Investigative Mission in Congo in fulfilling its mission
by publicly disclosing the names of officers and Rwandan units deployed
in
Congo from September 1996 up to the present, as well as all other
information relevant to their mandate.
Denounce deliberate killings of civilian refugees and Congolese civilians
during the war that brought the ADFL to power and up to the present.
Protect and assist refugees upon repatriation to Rwanda. Cooperate
fully
with the UNHCR in its efforts to protect and assist refugees, in particular
by providing access to recent returnees.
To all Members of the International Community, including the United
Nations,
the European Union and its member states, the United States, and the
Organization of African Unity
Insist that accountability for human rights abuses in Congo and Rwanda
not
be sacrificed for economic or diplomatic reasons. Members of the ex-FAR
and
Interahamwe militia, as well as individuals from the ADFL, RPA, and
other
militaries or mercenaries responsible for massive civilian killings
in
Rwanda or in Congo should not be granted impunity
Consider extending the mandate of the International Criminal Tribunal
in
Arusha to include jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity
committed during the war in Congo.
Make assistance for the Congolese judiciary an urgent priority once
the
government of Congo fully complies and cooperates with the U.N.
Investigative Mission. Insist on the development of the judiciary as
an
independent institution. Assist the Congolese government in the
establishment of other national institutions that will help to promote
the
rule of law, such as a permanent human rights commission, once full
cooperation with the U.N. team takes place.
Provide immediate aid to the Congolese population via nongovernmental
channels for humanitarian relief. Condition the convening of any donor
meetings and the granting of non-humanitarian aid, particularly balance
of
payments support, on full compliance and cooperation with the U.N.
Secretary-General's Investigative Mission and respect for human rights.
The
European Union should lift the suspension of development aid to Congo,
as
outlined in the Lom Convention, only upon full compliance and cooperation
with the U.N. Secretary-General's Investigative Mission.
Support Congolese organizations of civil society in their efforts
to
promote and protect human rights. Encourage the Congolese government
to
foster the growth of and consult with such organizations.
Make sufficient human and financial resources available to the UNHCR
to
enable a process of individual determination of refugee status for
Rwandans,
Burundians, and other refugees in the subregion. Protection, assistance,
and
the right to asylum should be provided to those who qualify by the
states of
the Great Lakes region as well as the international community.
Assure that ex-FAR, Interahamwe militia, and others implicated in
the 1994
genocide in Rwanda, as well as these forces and Mobutu's FAZ who have
committed war crimes and other humanitarian law violations under the
Mobutu
government or since the ADFL took power, are pursued wherever they
may be
and brought to justice.
The United Nations should continue its human rights investigation
in Congo
regardless of whether the Kabila government cooperates with the
investigation. If access to Congolese territory is impossible, the
U.N.
should continue the investigation based on sources available outside
the
country. The U.N. team should also investigate the various levels of
responsibility for the crisis, including the failure of the international
community to remove armed elements from the camps in eastern Zaire
and in
permitting them to prepare new combat against Rwanda.
Specific recommendations to the U.S. government
Publicly acknowledge and denounce deliberate killings of civilians
in
Congo by the members ADFL, troops of the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA)
and
members of other foreign militaries allied with the ADFL, and release
all
information available regarding these atrocities.
U.S. Department of Defense and other government agencies should fully
disclose the nature of all present and past involvement in training,
tactical support, field assistance, or arms shipments to Rwanda or
Congo for
use by the ADFL or Rwandan, Ugandan or other forces operating in the
Democratic Republic of Congo.
Conduct investigations to determine whether any of the military involved
in civilian massacres or other gross violations of international
humanitarian law have received training from the U.S. armed forces
or other
U.S. agencies, either in the region or in the U.S. Make public the
identities of any such military and insist on their prosecution where
appropriate.
Immediately suspend any tactical support, field assistance, or arms
shipments to Rwanda. The U.S. should conduct a thorough evaluation
of the
efficacy of U.S. military training to Rwanda in the areas of international
humanitarian law, military justice, and other areas pertaining to the
respect of human rights. The U.S. should make public its findings of
this
investigation.
III. BACKGROUND
The Origin of the Refugees
In April 1994, Hutu extremists used the military, administrative and
political structures of Rwanda to carry out a genocide against the
minority
Tutsi and to kill moderate Hutu who were seen as Tutsi collaborators.
Soldiers of the Rwandan Armed Forces (FAR) and members of militia groups
known as the Interahamwe took the lead in slaughtering more than 500,000
people.(3)
In July 1994, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), a predominantly Tutsi
movement, overthrew the genocidal government, against which it had
waged war
since 1991. Some two million Rwandans then fled to surrounding countries,
some because they feared retribution from the RPF, some because they
were
ordered to follow government leaders into exile. The estimated 1.1
million
who ended up in Zaire included both refugees as well as others who
were
implicated in crimes against humanity in their home country and remained
armed, planning to continue the genocide--and their war against the
RPF--from adjacent countries. This mixed population settled in camps,
the
great majority in Zaire and the next largest number in Tanzania, where
they
were nourished at the expense of the international community. Human
rights
organizations like Human Rights Watch and the International Federation
of
Human Rights (FIDH), humanitarian agencies, including the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and the Rwandan government
repeatedly demanded international intervention to separate the refugees,
many of them women and children, from the armed elements, former soldiers
(ex-FAR) and militia members. Although the U.N. prepared plans for
such
action, the Security Council rejected them as too expensive and perhaps
unworkable.
Administrative officials and military and political leaders responsible
for
the genocide controlled the camps and with the ex-FAR and militia
intimidated many refugees into staying in the camps instead of returning
home. Within Rwanda, human rights abuses, particularly killings by
soldiers,
massive arrests without regard to due process, and the paralysis of
the
judicial system also discouraged refugees from returning.
Beginning almost immediately after settling in the enormous border-area
camps, the ex-FAR and militia reorganized, trained new recruits and
bought
new arms from abroad. (4) As their incursions into Rwanda increased
in
number and impact, the government of Rwanda signaled that it would
act on
its own to end the threat from the camps in Zaire if the international
community failed to intervene. In the face of stepped-up infiltration
in
1996, a rash of killings of civilians in border areas, and apparently
aware
of preparations for an invasion, Rwandan leader General Paul Kagame
again
alerted leaders of the U.S. and perhaps other countries that Rwanda
would
act if conditions did not change.
Banyarwanda and Banyamulenge
Before the massive influx of Rwandans in 1994, about half of the 3 million
people of North-Kivu, in the former Zaire's extreme northeast, were
speakers
of Kinyarwanda, the language of Rwanda. Known collectively as Banyarwanda,
they included about four times as many Hutu as Tutsi.(5) Some had been
present before the drawing of colonial boundaries, while others had
migrated
from Rwanda for economic reasons or as political refugees during the
twentieth century, many with official encouragement from the Belgian
authorities in the 1930s. In some areas, such as Masisi, the Banyarwanda
comprised a large majority of the population.(6)
Of the Banyarwanda in South-Kivu, a group of pastorals on the Itombwe
plateau, principally near Mulenge, became known, at least to themselves,
as
the Banyamulenge (the people of Mulenge hill or forest) during the
rebellions against Mobutu in 1964. Most of the Banyamulenge are descendants
of Rwandans who fled political repression and population pressure in
Rwanda
during the 18th and 19th centuries;(7) other Banyarwanda immigrated
to the
area in more recent times, some fleeing oppression in Rwanda in 1959.
Many
Banyamulenge came under threat from the rebel forces led by Kabila
and
others in the 1964 uprisings and sought protection from the Mobutu
regime in
Kinshasa, while others sided with the rebellion. The term Banyamulenge
came
to be used widely in Congo to refer to ethnic Tutsi Congolese in general
from mid-1996.
The Citizenship Question
The right to Zairian citizenship, recognized for Banyamulenge and
Banyarwanda by earlier laws and constitutions, was limited in 1981
to those
people who could prove that their ancestors lived in Zaire before 1885.
But
the 1981 law was not actively enforced and identity cards of
Kinyarwanda-speakers were not revoked. Politicians who feared the number
of
votes represented by Kinyarwanda-speakers in proposed elections stirred
up
feelings against them among people of neighboring ethnic groups. At
the time
of the National Conference in 1991,(8) Celestin Anzuluni, a Bembe from
South-Kivu, led a move to exclude the Banyamulenge, claiming they were
not
Zairians but Rwandan immigrants.(9) Banyarwanda from North-Kivu were
similarly to be excluded. After this, leaders of other ethnic groups
increasingly challenged the rights of Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda
generally
to Zairian citizenship.
Violence Against Speakers of Kinyarwanda
In 1993, Hunde, Nande, and Nyanga civilian militia known as Mai-Mai
and
Bangilima, encouraged by government officials and sometimes supported
by the
Zairian military, attacked Hutu and Tutsi communities in North-Kivu,
killing
thousands and displacing some 300,000.(10) The arrival in Eastern Zaire
of
the enormous number of Rwandans in flight in 1994 exacerbated tensions
between previously resident Kinyarwanda-speakers and other ethnic groups.
The Interahamwe militia and many of the former military and civilian
authorities of Rwanda encouraged hatred of Tutsi among adjacent populations.
Local ethnic groups which had once viewed Hutu and Tutsi as a common
enemy
sided increasingly with Hutu, both refugees and local residents, in
attacking Tutsi, who were sometimes branded as loyal to the new government
of Rwanda. In South-Kivu, Bembe and Rega, encouraged by comments by
regional
politicians, began to organize militia, following the model of the
Interahamwe of Rwanda and the Mai-Mai and Bangilima of North-Kivu.(11)
Feeling increasingly threatened by harassment and arrests and talk of
expulsion,(12) numbers of Banyamulenge young men went to Rwanda where
they
joined or were trained by the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA), which also
supplied them with weapons. In South-Kivu, others organized their own
militia and bought arms during 1995. According to one witness, "The
Banyamulenge [even] bought rifles from the Interahamwe [in the refugee
camps]. . . . With the crisis in Zaire, the Interahamwe sold their
guns."(13)
In early 1996 Interahamwe, Mai-Mai, and Bangilima killed hundreds of
Tutsi
and drove more than 18,000 from North-Kivu into exile in Rwanda and
Uganda.(14)
The Banyamulenge Revolt
In August 1996, Zairian authorities banned MILIMA, a development and
human
rights nongovernmental (NGO) working among the Banyamulenge, and arrested
several prominent Banyamulenge. In early September Zairian authorities
said
Banyamulenge should leave the country, an order formalized on October
7 by
the deputy governor of South-Kivu, Lwasi Ngabo Lwabanji, who ordered
all
Banyamulenge to leave Zaire within a week.(15)
In early September, Bembe militia, supported by FAZ soldiers, began
attacking Banyamulenge villages, killing and raping, and forcing survivors
to flee. The Banyamulenge, joined by other groups, rose up against
the
Zairian government. They later formed a coalition, the Alliance of
Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL), and chose
Laurent-Desir Kabila as spokesman, a post he later transformed into
president of the movement. Rwandan, Ugandan and later Angolan troops
supported the ADFL and quickly overran the demoralized and poorly
disciplined Zairian Armed Forces (FAZ).(16) After a rapid advance from
east
to west, during which he was generally hailed as a liberator, Kabila
proclaimed himself head of the newly declared Democratic Republic of
Congo
on May 18, 1997.
Attacks on the Camps
As the ADFL forces and their allies began combat against the FAZ they
simultaneously attacked the camps sheltering the Rwandans, breaking
the
control of the former administrative and military authorities. In some
camps, the ex-FAR and militia retreated quickly, sometimes after briefly
resisting the ADFL advance. The majority of people in the camps, perhaps
600,000 of the 1.1 million estimated to have been in residence in October
1996, returned to Rwanda in November. Of those who returned, many went
voluntarily, while others were forced back by the ADFL, fearful of
the
conditions in Rwanda. A number estimated in the thousands died in the
first
weeks of the attacks on the camps, caught in crossfire between the
ADFL and
elements of the ex-FAR, militia and FAZ; killed by the former camp
authorities in an effort to prevent their return to Rwanda or to force
them
to accompany the ex-FAR and militia on their retreat westward; or killed
by
ADFL and RPA troops. Hundreds of thousands of Rwandans fled westward,
some
in relatively organized caravans, others in scattered small groups.
Tens of
thousands of these were armed elements, but the rest were unarmed civilians,
many of them women and children.
Many of the civilians who fled to the west were attacked again, some
of them
repeatedly as they sought safety. In a few cases, ex-FAR and militia
used
the refugees as human shields or even injured and killed them. But
in the
vast majority of instances, it was clearly ADFL soldiers and their
foreign
allies who slaughtered the refugees. In addition, untold thousands
died of
hunger or disease because ADFL and Zairian authorities denied humanitarian
agencies permission to enter their zones to deliver assistance or because
the security conditions prevented them from doing their work. Some
humanitarian workers testified that ADFL soldiers accompanied them,
supposedly to facilitate their work but really to find out where refugees
were hidden in order to return later to eliminate them.
The UNHCR states that it helped an additional 234,000 Rwandans return
to
Rwanda between December 1996 and June 1997 and that it had located
an
additional 52,600 Rwandans, about half of them in Congo and the other
half
dispersed in the Central African Republic, Congo (Brazzaville) and
Angola by
July 1997. According to the refugee agency's figures, an estimated
213,000
Rwandans remain unaccounted for, either dead in the period of violence
or
hidden in the forests or among the people of Congo.(17)
Controversy continues about the exact number of refugees who perished
during
the conflict due to massacres, malnutrition, or disease. Kabila's government
has effectively denied the U.N. Secretary-General's Investigative Team
and
other diplomatic missions or human rights organizations access to reported
massacre sites and thus has made assessment of the casualties impossible.
The Laws Violated
All parties to the war in Congo, whether rebel or governmental, are
bound by
international humanitarian law to respect basic norms concerning victims
of
armed conflict. In particular, regardless of whether a government or
an
insurgent group, all sides are obliged to apply common Article 3 of
the
Geneva Conventions of 1949:
In case of an armed conflict not of an international character occurring
in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to
the
conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions:
(1) Persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members
of
the armed forces who had laid down their arms and those placed hors
de
combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any other cause, shall be
in all
circumstances treated humanely, without any adverse distinction founded
on
race, colour, religion or faith, sex, birth or wealth, or any other
similar
criteria.
To this end the following acts are and shall remain prohibited at any
time
and in any place whatsoever with respect to the above-mentioned persons:
(a) violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds,
mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(b) taking of hostages;
(c) outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment;
(d) the passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without
previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording
all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.
Furthermore, all parties to the conflict in Congo should respect the
principles of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2444, which recognizes
the
customary law principle obliging all factions of an armed conflict
at all
times to treat civilians distinctly from combatants. It states that,
the following principles for observance by all government and other
authorities responsible for action in armed conflicts:
(a) That the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring
the enemy is not unlimited;
(b) That it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian populations
as such;
(c) That distinction must be made at all times between persons taking
part
in the hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect
that
the latter be spared as much as possible.
While the above principles apply to all parties to the war in Congo,
additional bodies of international humanitarian and human rights law
place
further obligations on certain parties to the conflict, notably the
government of the former Zaire, the ADFL authorities who succeeded
to the
international obligations of the former government, the government
of Rwanda
and other governmental allies of the ADFL.(18)
1. In addition to being president of Congo, Kabila is minister of defense
and commander in chief of the armed forces, but clearly he does not
control
all the soldiers participating in or allied with the ADFL who fought
on his
behalf. Substantial numbers of non-Congolese, including Rwandans, Ugandans,
Burundians, and Angolans assisted Congolese who helped put Kabila in
power,
with Rwandans playing the most visible role. Throughout this report,
we
refer to all these soldiers as the ADFL forces. Military leaders responsible
for massacres are discussed in greater detail in the "Who's in Charge:
Towards Establishing Responsibility" chapter of this report.
2. See Human Rights Watch/Africa and Federation Internationale des Ligues
des Droits de l'Homme, "Forced to Flee: Violence Against Ethnic Tutsi
in
Zaire," vol. 8, no. 2(A), July 1996.
3. Interahamwe were a militia organized by former Rwandan President
Juvenal
Habyarimana's political party. During the genocide in Rwanda, the militia
were transformed into bands of killers.
4. See Human Rights Watch/Arms Project, "Rearming with Impunity," A
Human
Rights Watch Short Report. (New York: May 1995) vol. 7, no. 4.
5. Mgr. Ngabu, "Situation qui prvaut dans le diocse autour des massacres
dans les zones de Walikale et Masisi," May 11, 1993. Cited in Aloys
Tegera,
"La rconcilliation communautaire: Le cas des massacres au Nord Kivu,"
in
Andr Guichoua, ed., Les Crises politiques au Burundi et au Rwanda
(Lille:
Universit des Sciences et Technologies de Lille, 1995), p. 399.
6. For a more detailed discussion of the origins of the Banyarwanda,
see
Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee: Violence against the Tutsi
in
Zaire," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 8, no. 2(A), July 1996.
7. David Newbury, "Irredentist Rwanda: Ethnic and Territorial Frontiers
in
Central Africa," Africa Today, vol. 44, no. 2, 1997.
8. The National Sovereign Conference was a meeting of all sectors of
Zairian
society that set the framework for the transition to democracy in Zaire.
9. J. Bruno Kadima Abuika, "Large complot ourdi contre le Congo-Kinshasa
dans sa partie Est," Umoja, February 26, 1996; Human Rights Watch/FIDH
interview with Jonas, a Munyamulenge, in Butare, January 10, 1996.
10. United States Committee on Refugees, "Inducing the Deluge," July 1993.
11. Originaires des Zones de Fizi, Mwenga et Uvira, "Droit de rponse
au
Mmorandum du 05/10/95 des immigrs rwandais sous le pseudonyme
'Banyamulenge,'" letter to Minister of the Interior, November 4, 1995.
12. Heritiers de la Justice, "Vue synoptique des violations des droits
de
l'homme au sud-kivu en 1995, Bukavu, December 10, 1995; Human Rights
Watch/FIDH interview with Jonas, a Munyamulenge, in Butare, January
10,
1996.
13. Human Rights Watch/FIDH interview at Bugarama Transit Camp, Cyangugu,
November 4, 1996.
14. See Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee: Violence against the
Tutsi
in Zaire"
15. Sam Ngoza, "Zaire's People of Tutsi Origin Say 'Enough is Enough,'
" All
Africa Press Service, November 12, 1996; "Crisis Grips Central Africa,"
The
Jakarta Post, December 23, 1996.
16. For details of human rights abuses in the early days of the war,
see
Human Rights Watch/FIDH, "Forced to Flee: Violence Against the Tutsis
in
Zaire"; Human Rights Watch/Africa & Fdration Internationale des
Ligues des
Droits de l'Homme,"'Attacked By All Sides,' Civilians and the War in
Eastern
Zaire," A Human Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 1(A), March
1997;
Human Rights Watch/Africa, "Transition, War and Human Rights," A Human
Rights Watch Short Report, vol. 9, no. 2(A), April 1997.
17. UNHCR public information fact sheet, July 2, 1997.
18. Notably, the former Zaire had ratified, among other treaties, the
four
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva
Conventions. The ADFL government of Congo succeeded to these obligations
on
May 17, 1997 when it ousted the Zairian authorities. The Rwandan government
has also ratified, among other treaties, the four Geneva Conventions
of 1949
and Protocols 1 and 2 Additional to the Geneva Conventions.