by K.K. Man Jusu, Côte d'Ivoire, January 2000
THEME = POLITICS
Military coups d'etat are usually
condemned,
but the recent coup by retired General Robert Gueï
is considered by Ivorians as a necessity
for "unfreezing"
the democratic process
Unthinkable! Unbelievable! Both locals and foreigners were astounded with the military coup d'etat which toppled President Henri Konan Bédié on 24 December 1999. President Bédié had been Head of State since 1993 when the country's first President Felix Houphouët-Boigny died. Bédié was democratically elected in 1995.
Unthinkable, because, even at a time when many African countries were being plagued by military coups, both Senegal and Côte d'Ivoire had managed to avoid them. So, people were certainly not expecting a military coup, especially in the new climate of democracy where political debate is the concern of citizens. Only recently, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit had declared that the time of military coups definitely belongs to the past.
However, observers of Côte d'Ivoire's political scene had been expecting something of that kind. The country's politicians were playing with fire when questioning the genuineness of the Ivorian nationality of Alassane Dramane Ouattara ("Ado" as he is popularly known), an election candidate. Ouattara was prime minister under Houphouët-Boigny, and a former IMF Assistant Director-General. The new electoral law states that candidates in the presidential election must hold Ivorian nationality. "Ado", however, was said to have come from Burkina Faso. But Ouattara was having none of it. He was determined to stick to his guns, and this was shown in a number of street demonstrations in his support. On 27 October 1999, his party's (the Republican Party - RDR) main leaders were arrested. These arrests, along with a detention order issued against Ado for falsifying his identity documents, brought matters to a head. General Gueï considered that he had to intervene in order to avoid "a state of imminent civil war". He said this was no coup d'etat; he was only saving the country from inevitable chaos. Yet, this raises a number of questions.
The origins of this political crisis go back to the 1980s. The Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire-African Democratic Rally (PDCI-RDA) alliance had held power since 1960 and all Ivorians were fed up with it and were craving for change. At that time, the country was going through a political crisis with numerous social problems, so something had to "give". 1990 was a year of crisis until the restoration of multiparty politics brought a semblance of order.
But, unlike many other countries which called National Conferences in order to make a new start along the road to democracy, Côte d'Ivoire opted for continuity. Why? Because President Houphouët-Boigny was having nothing to do with any National Conference, and those who were calling for change, could not make their voices heard. Consequently, from then on Côte d'Ivoire's politics were in a state of permanent crisis. Street demonstrations continued and peaked in February 1992, when the main leaders from political parties, trade unions and human rights organisations, were arrested.
While all this was going on, President Felix Houphouët-Boigny died on 7 December 1993. This did nothing to dampen down the crisis. Although Côte d'Ivoire's Constitution clearly defines the laws regarding succession to the presidency, those calling for change, opposed the selection of the Speaker of the National Assembly, Henri Konan Bédié to the highest Office in the land. They wanted to take advantage of the "Old Man's" death to effectuate in 1993 what they hadn't been able to achieve in 1990 - i.e. to establish a transition government in charge of working out a new Constitution and Electoral Code for a Second Republic. President Bédié and the PDCI were not prepared to accept this. After all, the Constitution guaranteed his succession. The crisis continued with the 1995 election boycott by the two main opposition parties; the actual elections were marked by considerable ethnic violence.
The present crisis must be seen in the same context. Elections were due this year and those fighting for change continued their struggle. This time, democratic change had to take place! That's when any constructive political debate proved impossible, with the whole climate being poisoned by the Alassane Ouattara affair. The scene was ripe for military intervention. General Gueï who is president of the National Salvation Council, puts it this way: "When civilians are unable to agree among themselves, then it's up to the military to undertake a spot of "house cleaning". There was something rotten about Côte d'Ivoire's present political scene - something completely at odds with Houphouët-Boigny's country which used to be universally respected". But many say, by kicking President Bédié out, the military have clearly taken sides.
Côte d'Ivoire's crisis is not just a political one, as there's the economy to consider. As long as Côte d'Ivoire's "miracle" was a going concern during the first twenty years following independence, nobody mentioned mistakes and injustices. But in the 1980s, the price of the country's main sources of income, coffee and cocoa, crashed. There was immense social upheaval and this led to the restoration of multiparty politics in 1990.
In 1994, with the devaluation of the CFA currency, there was an economic revival and the price of raw materials began to rise. Substantial loans to support the economy and to off-set the effects of devaluation and the structural adjustment programme, were announced. But six years later, the Ivorian people see only negative results as nothing concrete has materialised. True, those in power repeated over and again that growth would not be apparent before 2001, when the country's international debt would be cancelled. Today, Côte d'Ivoire is spending more than 50% of the national budget on debt reimbursement.
People accuse the government of incompetence and mismanagement; of being involved in many financial scandals - e.g. more than 15 billion CFA francs from the European Union given as medical aid, are missing. (The EU has sent a strong team to look into what has happened to its missing billions, but will there be any follow-up to the visit?) But the fact is, repeated "affairs" of this type, end up by discrediting any government, and Bédié's was no exception. The people had lost their confidence and refused to make any further sacrifices in the name of national solidarity.
First, the students started putting forward claims which the government could not possibly meet; then the civil servants demanded wage increases. And, as is usual in such cases, one piece of bad luck is closely followed by another. In Côte d'Ivoire's case, the price of exports again dropped. When the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) saw what was happening, they suspended their support because what they termed "mismanagement". Already the implementation of austerity measures and a generalised increase in living costs had accentuated the government's unpopularity. People welcomed the 24 December coup with a sigh of relief and even enthusiasm. Like Baré Maïnassara in Niger, Henri Konan Bédié paid the price of allowing structural adjustment to be imposed on Côte d'Ivoire.
The military say they'll bring about national reconciliation and strengthen the country's unity following recent events. But General Gueï has set out on a risky journey and he's already given the impression of siding with Ouattara. If Bédié's supporters refuse all attempts at reconciliation with the present situation, then the problem will remain unsolved.
Laurent Gbagbo, leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (FPI) has condemned the junta's bias, and has warned General Gueï that his actions must be unequivocal and impartial. Moreover, it seems that Bédié's downfall has done nothing to end the "Ouattara Affair". Gueï received general support for his coup because the country was being badly run, not because people want Ouattara to be President. Walls in Abidjan are daubed with slogans such as: "Ado, you Burkinabé, go home!", and "Ado, who is your mother?". And the daily Notre Vie, sympathetic to the FPI's policies, has threatened to resurrect discussions relating to Ouattara's management as prime minister - not forgetting, of course, the thorny question of his nationality.
And how long will the military stay in power? Ev-erybody is waiting for an election calendar but the military don't appear to be in a hurry as, according to their own saying, it takes time to "clean the house". Even if General Gueï says he's not interested in hanging onto power, people believe that he'll stand as a presidential candidate. This could create a situation similar to that of Maïnassara in Niger.
Those working for the return of democracy to Côte d'Ivoire are hoping for the necessary reforms which will lead to genuine democracy: A new Constitution, a new Electoral Code, an independent Electoral Commission - all leading to free and open elections. In short, Robert Gueï is expected to be for Côte d'Ivoire what Amadou Toumani Toure, Abdulsalami Abubakar, Ansumane Mane, Daouda Malam Wande were in other African countries - military who seized power in order to pave the way for democracy.
"Real democracy" may, after all, be found at gun point!
END