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Nuclear ingredient in the war of DRC and a difficult choice for Kigali

Sat, 21 Aug 1999 13:10:23 +0200

"serv. informazioni Congosol" <congosol@neomedia.it>

"serv. informazioni Congosol" <congosol@neomedia.it>

WILL THE RCD (the rebel movement) CONTINUE TO DESERVE THE SYMPATHY OF
OTHERS STATES WHOSE INTERESTS MAY BE INVOLVED IN THE CONGO-WAR?
(Discussion paper by Heritiers de la justice)

The Rwandese government is about to face a choice between its long time
relationship with Uganda and its alliance with the RCD-Goma led by Ilunga
(more precisely its own agenda in Congo).

As a matter of fact, the Rwandese army cannot afford a long war in Congo,
unless it can keep hands on the minerals of Kisangani, such as diamond.
The gold mines of Kimutuga (in South Kivu) that the alliance RCD-Goma and
the Rwandese army control may not be enough for paying for a long chase of
the Interahamwe.
Even if the mines of Kamituga could be sufficient, the presence of the
Mai-Mai around seems to constitute a real factor which may jeopardize any
accomplishment of full economic activities.

Consequently, Rwanda cannot afford loosing control over Kisangani the
second diamond pole after Mbujimayi, since it has been quite uneasy to
conquer the latter.
This seems to be the bottom line of the last week's deadly clashes between
the Rwandese and Ugandans troops.
However, on might raise a number of scenarios:

1. The first scenario: Rwanda might prefer to strengthen its relationship with the RCD-Goma, expecting to overcome the Kisangani crisis militarily.
   Some specialists argue that if that is what Rwanda opts for, it shall
   increase the number of its troops presently in Kisangani by at least 5,000
   more soldiers.
   One part of these men would be given the mission of protecting the mines
   around Banalia, Bengamisa and Buta, etc whereas other would be continuing
   the initial objective, which is carrying on the anti-Kabila military
   campaign. The same experts foresee two major negative consequences of this
   option. On the one hand, an increase in number of Rwandese troops in
   Kisangani would incite Uganda to do the same; and the consequence would be
   that both countries would get involved into a cycle of more and more troops
   until one of them will have to give up.
   This would also weaken the southern front to the advantage of Kabila and
   his FAC.
   Indeed, on this front, a considerable number of soldiers are said to have
   deserted the ranks of the rebellion. On the other hand, more Rwandese
   troops in Kisangani would weaken the security on their borders with Congo.
   More and more reliable reports indicate that the Interahamwe and Ex-FAR
   have grown in number and techniques since the congo war and that they
   remain closer to Rwandese borders.
   There are reports that the more Rwanda will commit its troops deep in
   Congo, the less its borders will be protected against the Interahamwe.
   Mind us that from the Ruandese borders with Congo and Kisangani there are
   at least 400 miles and that the air constitute the only means of transport
   between these two places.
   There are no roads, no trains or whatever.
   In other words Rwandese soldiers stranded at Kisangani would not be of any
   use in case there is a sudden attack of the Interahamwe, who are said to be
   not as far as 70 miles from the Rwandese borders with Congo.

   
   

2. The second scenario: Rwanda might decide to give more weight to its alliance with Uganda to the expense of its relationship with the RCD-Goma.
   The likelihood of this scenario depends on the determination of Ouganda to
   not have something with the RCD-Goma, which has been discrediting the
   Ugandan army by accusing it of corruption, luck of discipline, etc.
   The Ugandan army is said to be hurt by these accusations and the heavy
   casualties it suffered during the clash of Kisangani.
   Colonel Kahinda, Museveni security adviser was quoted sating that even the
   loss of 6 Ugandans soldiers is too much and should not happen at the first
   place.
   He called the Ruandese surprise attack an act of treacherous.
   If the Ugandans maintain the bar this high during the negotiations with
   Rwanda, the latter may be forced to abandon the RCD-Goma or at least some
   of its current leaders, who have lashed out against Uganda.
   This scenario would secure the Rwanda-Ugandan alliance, would also secure
   Rwandese share to the minerals of Kisangani and finally would prevent
   Rwanda from loosing on of its last all in the region. However there is one
   thing that Rwanda have to concede to Uganda.
   Rwanda must understand that Uganda cannot stay for long in Congo.
   The Ugandan government is already under tremendous pressure from the its
   public opinion, its parliament et possibly its army to make sure it can get
   out of the congo as quick as possible.
   If Rwanda count on Ugandan support it has to understand this, unless it
   (Rwanda) thinks it can carry on a one-man anti-Kabila show.
   In fact the Rwandese government is a position that it has to strike a
   balance between all the involved interests.

   
   

By the beginning of last week, the Rwandese vice-president Paul Kagame and
the RCD-Goma's leader Ilunga were said to have had a conversation on the
phone with the US Secretary of State Suzan Rice.
Although the subject of the conversation was not revealed, the next day the
leader of the RCD-Goma was quoted saying that its movement was among other
conditions asking Kabila's government to cease contact with the
North-Koreens, reported to be around the Uranium mine of Tchinkolobwe in
Shaba.
It is worth to remember that North Korea is presently under an
international pressure aiming at preventing it from testing its nuclear
missiles, which are said to be able to reach the State of Alaska in the
United State.
If the threat of the Korean missile is proved to have links with the
presence of Koreans in Congo then the congo-war might shift from being
regarded as an issue of US international policy to being considered as
threatening US national security.
Whatever is said, the mere fact that at the same time North Korea is
threatening to test these missiles it is said to have more than 300
military officers and instructors within the area of the Congolese Uranium
mine worries more than one.
The international community, as a whole, has not interest in seeing a
country such as North Korea accessing to an uncontrollable quantity of
uranium.
The question is whether the international community can afford to witness
the Congo becoming a second Somalia, a country out of control.
It could become constitute a threat to international peace and security.
Two weeks ego, some news agencies reported an arrest of a group of people
trying to smuggle uranium from congo into Belgium.
Is not under the so-called international isolation that North Korea set up
its nuclear missile business.
God know what will happens if theses North Korea missile are successfully
tested and if this country gets keep its hand Congolese uranium mine for
long time.
In August 1998, when the RCD started the anti-Kabila campaign, it promised
a fast military campaign that would end up in making the Congo a stable
country capable of contributing to international peace and security.
One year later, many doubt about the possibility of realizing this objective.
The recent events of Kisangani, the desertion that the rebel movement is
said to be experiencing in Shaba, the lack of public support and the report
indicating that the Intehamwe are more stronger since the congo war started
question the RCD ability to keep its words.
Many who thought the RCD could make it, are more and skeptical and might be
thinking of something else.
The populations of Congo is no longer under any illusion. Even some African
leaders, such as Thabo Mbeki have said that a military solution cannot
bring peace and long term stability in the region.

In the same vein of its world campaign for peace in central Africa,
launched in May 1999 (Millennium Christian Action for Peace in Central
Africa) Heritiers de la Justice, continue to believe that it is worth to
support the Lusaka agreements signed on July 10, 1999.
Do you share this view, please write us.

Heritiers de la Justice
Services des Eglises Protestantes pour les Droits humains et la Paix au
Kivu-DRC
Internet adresse: http://www.heritiers.org
mailto:E.mail:heritiers@yahoo.com

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