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SPECIAL REPORT

Putting Humpty Dumpty Together: Reconstructing Peace in the Congo John Prendergast and David Smock

CONTENTS

1. Briefly...
2. Introduction
3. Multinational War with a Multiplicity of Interests 4. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi

5. The Rebel Signatures
6. Allies Supporting Kabila
7. Nonstate Actors and Kivu Elements
8. Economic and Social Roots of Congolese Conflict 9. Policy Responses

10. Encouraging Peace Processes
    • National and Regional levels
    • Local Level
11. Democratic Institution Building
12. Human Rights Promotion
13. Economic Development Support
14. Enhancing Security
15. The Way Ahead

    
    

The Democratic Republic of the Congo

1. Briefly... Standing today at a crossroads between war and peace, the Congo threatens either to drag the entire Central African region into a quagmire of conflict or to provide the engine of economic reconstruction necessary for stability and democratization.

The international community must provide robust support for the implementation of the Lusaka agreement, including its provisions for a national dialogue to address key issues of governance in the Congo and for a joint military commission (JMC) to harmonize regional efforts to disarm or otherwise neutralize the numerous Congo-based insurgencies destabilizing neighboring countries. The international community must also direct support toward grassroots efforts at coexistence and reconciliation, toward democratic institution building and human rights advocacy in the Congo and the surrounding region, toward economic development as a tool of peacebuilding, and toward demobilization and reintegration.

2. Introduction Twice in the past three years, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, formerly known as Zaire) has exploded into a multicountry conflict sparked by regional efforts to overthrow a sitting government. The 1996-97 war succeeded in dislodging the former Zairian dictator Mobutu Sese Seko. But the current effort, one that has deeply divided Africa and sparked its first nearly continentwide war, has failed to unseat Laurent Kabila's government. A comprehensive cease -fire agreement negotiated in Lusaka provides a hopeful road map to regional peace, if the internal and external belligerents choose that path.

On a fundamental level, the reverberations of the 1994 Rwandan genocide and the ensuing refugee crisis in eastern Zaire continue to echo throughout Central Africa. If this legacy of genocide and the crisis of legitimacy of the Congolese state continue to remain unresolved by the region and unaddressed by the world, the war will likely continue and Africa's efforts to forge its own renaissance will be severely undermined.

Two issues of international principle have collided in the Congolese conflagration. On the one hand is the international obligation to counter the threat to international peace and security--and the threat of genocide--posed by the ex-FAR/Interahamwe (the former Rwandan army and its allied militias which perpetrated the genocide) and other militias using Congolese soil as a base from which to launch attacks into neighboring countries and wreak havoc in the Congo. On the other hand is the need to uphold the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo and other states in the region. In response to a lack of seriousness on the part of the Congolese government regarding the first principle, Uganda and Rwanda overran the second principle and attempted to overthrow that government. Significantly, the cease-fire agreement negotiated in Lusaka affirmed both principles. It recognized that the Congo's territorial integrity cannot be restored fully until its soil is no longer used as a launching pad for

The August 1998 invasion of the Congo by Rwanda and Uganda and Rwanda's brutal counterinsurgency tactics in the Congo against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe have reduced many African governments' sympathies for the antigenocide agenda and increased regional impatience with Rwanda and Uganda and their violation of Congolese sovereignty. This situation in turn has increased Rwanda's sense of isolation and its justifiable belief that little international support will be forthcoming for its effort to counter the genocidaires.

It should not be forgotten that the international community shares responsibility for the continuation of this culture of impunity, from its ignoring the 1972 genocide against Hutus in Burundi; to its generous Cold War -era support to Mobutu; its support for the Rwandan regime, which committed the 1994 genocide; its lack of response to the genocide itself; and its maintenance of and failure to disarm the genocidaires in the refugee camps in the two years following the genocide. The need for the international community to support the implementation of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement provides a major opportunity for a belated assumption of its responsibilities.

3. Multinational War with a Multiplicity of Interests

The Congolese war today is fashioned from a long chain of interlocking African conflicts. These include:

The Congolese government versus assorted rebel groups The Rwandan government versus the Congolese government The Rwandan government versus Rwandan insurgents
The Ugandan government versus Sudan-supported rebels The Ugandan government versus the Congolese government The Ugandan and Rwandan governments versus the
Zimbabwean and Angolan governments
Rwandan-backed Congolese rebels versus Ugandan-backed Congolese rebels
The Ugandan government versus the Rwandan government The Burundian government versus Burundian rebel
factions
The Angolan government versus UNITA and anyone who supports UNITA
Mai-Mai elements versus the Rwandan government and RCD (Rally for Congolese Democracy) forces
Sudanese government versus the Ugandan government Since the advent of this war in August 1998, Kabila has been able to consolidate political support with a nationalist appeal both for Congolese sovereignty and to anti-Tutsi prejudice. But desertions and military setbacks have forced the Congolese government and its allies increasingly to rely on the support of ex-FAR/Interahamwe, ADF (the Allied Democratic Front of Uganda), and FDD (Forces for Democracy and Development from Burundi) units to slow the advance of its opponents. As early as November 1998, the UN Commission on Arms Flows charged the Congolese committed the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The Congolese, Ugandans, and Rwandans dispute which came first: cooperation with the genocidaires (the Ugandan and Rwandan view) or the rebellion/intervention (the Congolese view). On the rebel side, the RCD and MLC (Movement for the Liberation of the Congo) are both collections of individuals, political parties, and militia forces. Both the RCD and MLC are heavily dependent on Rwanda and Uganda, respectively, for military support. although their ability to conduct independent operations is increasing. The parties--the rebels and their government backers alike--have overlapping but not identical agendas and interests. For example, the RCD represents a number of different interest groups, only some of which answer to Rwanda's instructions. Among these groups are unreconstructed Mobutuists, genuine progressives, and political opportunists. The perception that the Rwandan government controls the RCD has effectively prevented it from developing much grassroots support in the territories nominally under its control, so that it has yet to become a force greater than the sum of its parts.

4. Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi Uganda has moved more aggressively since the end of the Lusaka negotiations to assert its interests militarily, through support to rebel MLC advances, consolidation of control in Kisangani, and promotion of Wamba dia Wamba as the leader of the RCD.

Rwanda has a number of direct and indirect objectives behind its continuing involvement in the Congo: security promotion, by displacing its war into the Congo and thus moving associated human rights and security problems out of northwest Rwanda; nation-building, in order to leave behind a structure in the Congo that can fill the current vacuum of authority; economic expansion and commercial development, through the exploitation of minerals now and the rerouting of trade routes toward the east in the future; and human rights promotion, by protecting Congolese Tutsi populations and ensuring that ethnic cleansing or worse will not befall those populations. Indeed, Congolese Foreign Minister Yerodia told us that he worries that the Rwandan and Ugandan forces will not want to leave the Congo until the last ex-FAR/Interahamwe has been captured. It is important to understand the context of traumatization and siege mentality that the 1994 genocide, the post-1993 ethnic cleansing efforts in the Kivus, and 1996--98 ex-FAR/Interahamwe assault on northwest Rwanda have produced in the Rwandan leadership. Against the backdrop of a lack of international support for the effort to counter the genocidaires, Rwanda acts as if its ends - - the eradication of the threat of genocide -- justify its means, no matter how unwelcome by or costly to local Congolese populations. Huge problems accompany Rwanda's continuing intervention in the DRC: increased instability in eastern Congo; alienation of Congolese populations against Rwanda, with the latter seen as a force of occupation and puppet master of the RCD; the angering of other African countries, which resent Rwanda's tactics and are suspicious that its agendas are irredentist and economic in nature; the delegitimization of the antigenocide effort; increasing resentment of local opulations against Congolese Tutsi, thus ironically increasing Tutsi insecurity as long as Rwandan forces are on Congolese soil; undermining of local Congolese efforts at coexistence and reconciliation; and fueling of perceptions that Rwanda and Uganda have territorial ambitions in the Congo, perceptions that Kabila and some of his allies actively promote.

5. The Rebel Signatures Tensions and disagreements between Uganda and Rwanda over the prosecution of the Congolese war, exacerbated by local disputes over the control of resources, manifested themselves at the worst possible juncture, when the governments and rebels were ready to sign the cease-fire agreement in Lusaka. The issue of the rebel signatures has been a pure power play on the part of the rebels and their backers. The process of determining the RCD's leadership has been disputed and has reflected the difference in approach to the rebellion between Rwanda and Uganda. During the second week of August 1999, this dispute erupted into open conflict in Kisangani between competing factions, with the support and involvement of Uganda and Rwanda. It is remarkable that these two governments would allow their disputes to deteriorate in this manner, jeopardizing the Lusaka peace agreement. Uganda is training militia to support Wamba dia Wamba, who heretofore had no forces, while Rwanda has actively suppressed local support for Wamba in Kisangani. Rwanda and the RCD-Goma leadership have little popular support in Kisangani, where resentment is building against Rwanda. Nevertheless, Uganda's arming and marshalling of support for Wamba was provocative and ill -timed, even if his expulsion from the leadership of the RCD was "undemocratic," as he and the Ugandans charge. Just at the time when Ethiopia and Eritrea are closing in on the end of their destructive war, another conflict between erstwhile allies Uganda and Rwanda appeared to be in the making. But the leadership of both governments, determined not to allow this to happen, signed a cease-fire and cooperation agreement after intensive discussions and with the constructive contribution of U.S. envoys. The Rwanda-Uganda agreement crafted a creative solution to the impasse over the rebel signatures, allowing all fifty of the RCD's founding members to sign the cease-fire document. But if the spirit of compromise is not sustained, both countries will walk over the edge of the cliff together, because no one will understand or support their reasons for conflict. Burundi also faces insurgent attacks from two Hutu rebel movements based in the Congo--the FDD and Palipehutu. Government forces have deployed to eastern Congo to conduct counterinsurgency operations, sometimes in coordination with Rwandan, Ugandan, and RCD forces. Burundi was not officially recognized as one of the external belligerents at the Lusaka peace talks, and thus was not a signatory. Nevertheless, the Burundian rebel groups were branded by the Lusaka agreement as nonstate actors that must be disarmed. The rebels will probably seek to go to Burundi or Tanzania if their disarmament appears imminent.

6. Allies Supporting Kabila Zimbabwean President Mugabe refused to accept the move by Rwanda and Uganda to unseat Kabila and deployed his significant military forces to Kabila's defense. The economic benefits--a secondary objective--came quickly, as a management contract for Gecamines, the main Katangan mining parastatal, was transferred to two Zimbabwean companies. Since signing the cease-fire accord, Zimbabwean forces are regrouping, fortifying defenses, and concentrating troops in certain areas. Zimbabwe appears to have a strong commitment to withdrawing forces as soon as possible, as domestic sentiment against its involvement in the war and economic pressures mount. Zimbabwe needs an honorable exit, which a properly implemented Lusaka agreement provides.

Other countries are less relevant to the Congolese government's defense. Efforts include Namibia's political and symbolic military support; Chad and Libya's military aid; and Sudan's occasional aerial bombings of rebel positions, arms transfers to the Congolese government, and support to the nonstate actors.

7. Nonstate Actors and Kivu Elements The Lusaka cease-fire agreement identifies nine nonstate actors targeted for disarmament. The ex-FAR/Interahamwe have benefited most from the DRC conflict. Rearmed by the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments, they have experienced a rejuvenation. Some of the key ringleaders of the genocide, such as General Augustin Bizimungu, are alleged to be commanding ex-FAR/Interahamwe forces in the Congo, whose numbers are estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000. If the Lusaka agreement is implemented, some ex-FAR/Interahamwe units will likely disperse in search of friendlier terrain, which might be found in the Kivus with some of the Mai-Mai and FDD units, or in Congo-Brazzaville or the Central African Republic. This dispersal will lead to a further internationalization of the genocidaires problem, making UN Security Council enforcement of the embargo against them even more vital. It will also lead to further fragmentation of the ineffective Congolese military, as its frontline militia pawns are disarmed or

The recent historical context of the Kivus produces its own impetus to prolong the conflict. Eastern Congo--closely linked to Rwandan and Burundian instability --has provided fuel for wave after wave of fires throughout the Congo and the broader region, beginning with Mobutu's manipulation of the Banyarwanda citizenship issue, to the influx of Rwandan refugees following the 1994 genocide, to the rearming of the genocidaires in the refugee camps, to the efforts to ethnically cleanse the Congolese Tutsi from North Kivu, to the ignition of both the 1996 & 97 war and the current conflict.

During the past year, Rwanda's displacement of its war with the ex -FAR/Interahamwe into DRC has had an extremely negative effect on the Kivus by increasing insecurity and displacement and preventing economic reconstruction and expanded trade. The longer the war continues, the more conditions ripen for warlordism. All of the parties increasingly are arming themselves to protect their interests. Manipulation of ethnic differences in the Kivus fed by hate -mongering and economic insecurity is perhaps the key contributor to instability in the eastern DRC. Mai-Mai elements provide an example. Mai-Mai have traditionally been a local defense mechanism for the properties of local communities. These indigenous militia have been involved in many of the uprisings that have occurred in the region since the colonial period. There are indications that Rwanda's occupation of certain areas of the Congo is being used by some Mai-Mai leaders to mobilize beyond peasant militias in local areas and even develop ad hoc alliances with FDD and Interahamwe units. This mobilization can take on a strong anti-Tutsi edge, although some leaders told us that there is nothing inherently anti-Tutsi about the Mai-Mai movement, as many of the groups had actually formed to defend against Banyarwanda Hutu encroachments on their lands. Their associations with Interahamwe units are tactical, and likely do not represent a sharing of the latter's genocidal ideology. Some Mai-Mai leaders--including key commanders Dunia and Louetcha--realized that they could not remain completely autono

Outside of the Mai-Mai structure, Congolese Hutu communities in North Kivu also have militias, we were told, which primarily protect agricultural interests. Mai-Mai leaders maintain that their militia is primarily anti-Rwandan, countering what they see as an attempt by Rwandans to use Kivu as an outlet for their demographic and economic problems. In this view, while Hutu Banyarwanda and Mai-Mai may at present find themselves in tactical alliances against Congolese Tutsi, these arrangements are inherently unstable, as the Mai-Mai view all Congolese Hutu and Tutsi as a threat.

8. Economic and Social Roots of Congolese Conflict

The Congolese government has sought to take over control of diamond sales, has outlawed such sales in dollars, and is seizing goods destined for export and exporting them directly. Rwanda is exporting tantalite and other minerals, while Uganda is exporting gold and diamonds. Zimbabwe may be earning $10 million a month in diamond exports, and is girding to protect Mbuji-Mayi's mines- -Kinshasa's key remaining revenue source--from possible attack.

Competition for land, resources, and favored positions in a poverty-stricken environment fuels rivalries between Tutsi and non-Tutsi populations. The prevalence of minerals and export crops throughout rebel-controlled territories and the value of land in areas such as Masisi in North Kivu increases the stakes. Economic collapse and demographic pressure feeds insecurities and resentment, providing a fertile ground for recruitment into various military forces.

Some Kivu residents report an increase in the use of racist ideology (particularly anti-Tutsi sentiment) for mobilization. There is a rise in the use of hate tracts and propaganda,

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