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although the origins
of much of the literature are unclear. Such tactics have fed Mai-Mai recruitment.

The longer the war keeps rumbling along and the vacuum of governance persists, the more opportunities will exist for an increase in transnational threats based in or emanating from the Congo. For example, the combination of Congo's resources and lack of regulation could be exploited by money launderers, drug and diamond smugglers, arms dealers, sanctions busters, or even terrorists. Deadly diseases already constitute a threat, and an inability to contain potential epidemics also should be considered a transnational threat, given previous outbreaks of the Ebola virus and other virulent diseases.

9. Policy Responses As mentioned, three issues must be addressed to bring peace to the Congo: equitable distribution of power throughout the Congo; integrated, coordinated and multifaceted counterinsurgency campaigns against the nonstate actors that continue to feed off the DRC vacuum and destabilize neighboring countries; and a coherent strategy for addressing the boiling cauldron called Kivu. The Lusaka agreement attempts to address the first two issues but fails to fully elaborate a strategy for resolving the complex issues specific to eastern Congo.

Success will require the use of both incentives and pressures during the implementation process. In addition to the provision of aid as an incentive, pressures must be exerted. Discussion could center around specific and graduated sanctions that would be applied uniformly against any violator of the Lusaka terms. And when the United Nations and OAU endorse the agreement, any country that violates the agreement--signatory or nonsignatory--through the provision of arms or sanctuary to the nonstate actors should be sanctioned. All sides in the conflict think that the others need to be pressured to implement the agreement in good faith, so a package of transparent pressures and incentives should be constructed multilaterally.

Doing so would require a much greater degree of international coordination than exists presently. Major donors should give consideration to a Friends of Peace in the Congo mechanism, which could harness international actions and build on examples of coordination, such as the World Bank Trust Fund for the DRC. It could also help coordinate diplomatic support for the agreement's implementation, particularly for the important task of cajoling key parties to implement fully all the provisions of the agreement, such as Rwanda's timetable for withdrawal, Zimbabwe's support for JMC actions, and the Congo's constructive participation in planning for the national dialogue. Each of these issues must be addressed at multiple levels. For example: The question of citizenship status of Congolese Tutsi populations remains explosive. A comprehensive social, legal, and economic strategy must be fashioned for this issue, including community meetings on coexistence, civic education, free movement of people, economic development, secure land tenure, protection of individual and group rights, and local defense mechanisms. The law on citizenship should be crafted with maximum transparency and consultation, and could be part of a broader constitutional process. Addressing the broader security concerns of Congolese Tutsi (without fuelling perceptions of special treatment) might enhance the case for an earlier departure of Rwandan troops, a trade-off that many Congolese might be willing to make. Elements of the ex-FAR/Interahamwe, the ADF, and other groups must be separated from civilian populations and disarmed. To conduct a successful counterinsurgency campaign, strategists must deploy military, judicial, political, social, and economic tools. In northwest Rwanda, the Rwandan government was successful in transforming what began as a brutal military offensive against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and suspected sympathizers into a more comprehensive counterinsurgency operation. The strategy involved the creation of local defense groups that acted as a ìneighborhood watch" against the Interahamwe, the development of a popular education campaign about the Interahamwe, the reintegration of sizable numbers of ex-FAR into the Rwandan military, the provision of humanitarian support with limited donor assistance, the holding of local elections, and the aggressive separation--with local leadership--of armed and unarmed elements of the population. The JMC must adopt such an integrated strategy, along with a

10. Encouraging Peace Processes

• National and Regional Levels: Even if it ultimately falls apart, it is important to recognize the tremendous achievement of the long and winding African-led peace process that resulted in the Lusaka cease-fire agreement. Zambia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and South Africa all played crucial roles in bringing about a process which culminated in the creation of the ceasefire document, which addresses most of the fundamental issues fueling the conflict. The United States also played an important behind -the-scenes role in support of the African mediation, particularly through the participation at key junctures of Undersecretary of State Tom Pickering, Assistant Secretary for African Affairs Susan Rice, Special Assistant to the President Gayle Smith, and Special Envoy Howard Wolpe. At this critical juncture, while parties determine whether Lusaka will be implemented, it is imperative that the United States be actively engaged on a daily basis with all of the parties. In addition to the work already being done by U.S. embassies in the region, Special Envoy Howard Wolpe--perhaps with an enhanced mandate--and other appropriate, high-level assistance and personnel from Washington must work through in great detail with all the parties (including the rebels) each aspect of the agreement. Common understanding of the way forward in each area will be key during implementation, and continuous discussion will be necessary around contentious issues, to supplement the efforts of the JMC. Ideally, this would be done in close coordination or even jointly with EU Envoy Aldo Ajello and other key international actors. At the national and regional levels, just as in the Horn of Africa, mechanisms for bilateral technical and political consultation are needed in the Great Lakes region. For example, the Rwandan and Ugandan governments, assumed to be close enough that they would not consider coming to blows (just as was the case with Ethiopia and Eritrea before their war), require some kind of institutionalized channel of communication on a broad array of issues, to which the United States and others could contribute technical assistance. The JMC will povide a potential vehicle for regional military cooperation and dispute resolution. And bilateral mechanisms for discussing future relations are needed for all of the governments involved in the Congo, particularly between Rwanda and Congo. Opportunities for conflict resolution between neighboring countries and their own insurgencies must be supported as well. Enhanced efforts to accelerate the pace of the Burundian peace talks in Arusha may be under way, and there are indications that some elements of the ADF may be interested in negotiating with the Ugandan government.
• Local Level: In the Kivus, Rwanda, and Burundi, local populations speak of the importance of peaceful cohabitation, coexistence, and even reconciliation. More enlightened leaders see the importance of getting the ethnic-hatred genie back in the bottle before more serious damage is done. Local initiatives--some rooted deeply in grassroots conflict management traditions--promoting these values and exploring practical ways of living together occur throughout the Great Lakes region, usually with little outside support. Other efforts under way focus on campaigns against the Interahamwe and separation of local populations from militia forces. Much more could be done with very small amounts of flexible resources provided to communities where coexistence is occurring or being promoted. Banyamulenge civilians will not be protected by laws alone, or by the Rwandan government and/or the international community. The Banyamulenge community--along with other Congolese Tutsi populations--requires social acceptance. Some traditional leaders and intellectuals in South Kivu have begun conflict -resolution initiatives between Banyamulenge and other local communities or Mai -Mai leaders. These initiatives are unlikely to lead to truly stable outcomes as long as the war continues and as long as there is a vacuum of legitimacy at the level of the provincial government, which for nearly a century has been the broker and guarantor of such arrangements. Some efforts have made progress. For example, in an area called Kasiba where killings had left tensions very high, large community meetings were held, during which citizens vented accusations and discussed the way forward. The communities created a committee to follow through on resolutions of the meetings, such as the reestablishment of the livestock market. Other efforts are under way by Kivu communities to separate civilian populations from armed groups and to invite armed groups to lay down their weapons and reintegrate. It is in the context of these kinds of initiatives that international community representatives should be contacting Mai-Mai leaders. Ignoring them will only strengthen their resolve to undermine national and regional agreements in defense of their perceived interests.

In addition to intercommunal mechanisms, many of our interlocutors called for civic education or peace education campaigns. Congolese nongovernmental organizations have launched a "Civil Society Campaign for Peace" that aims to undertake peace advocacy initiatives, prepare populations for the national dialogue called for in the Lusaka agreement, conduct surveys on the consequences of the war, hold discussion and training sessions on conflict resolution, develop written materials, and strengthen local groups and initiatives promoting coexistence and reconciliation. It will provide an important link between populations in the east and west, as civil society organizations on all sides of the conflict will be participating.

11. Democratic Institution Building If implemented properly, the national dialogue called for in the Lusaka agreement will be a major opportunity to address fundamental issues related to the reconstruction of the state. This initiative must be inclusive, involving participation from all Congolese regions through consultative mechanisms and allowing ample time for full input. The selection of a neutral facilitator will be key. The Congolese government, rebels, political parties, and civil society groups must all be properly represented at the dialogue. The RCD will press a number of issues at the dialogue, including federalism, regional autonomy, and citizenship rights for Banyarwanda populations. Kivu residents in particular, to the extent that they are represented, will press for a federal government in the Congo that will allow the Kivus to be managed by Kivu residents. This sentiment is shared by leaders of other provinces throughout the DRC, and will be advocated strongly in any debate about the nature of the state. The constituency for decentralization and federalism has been very strong since the fall of Mobutu. The Kabila regime's failure to deliver on this with any consistency is its greatest political liability, although the issue is counterbalanced and obfuscated by the strong pull of nationalist sentiment engendered by the war. For federalism to be successful, the rights of minorities will have to be protected by both judicial and administrative oversight, and resource control will have to be devolved as well. Most external actors have chosen not to engage with the various rebel factions and administrations, worried about the potential signal such engagement might send of support for the insurgency or a lack of concern for the Congo's territorial integrity. But even absent egagement, erroneous perceptions are widespread that this engagement is under way anyway, particularly with respect to the United States. Without any presumption of recognition and as part of a transition process linked to the implementation of the Lusaka agreement, the United States and other governments should regularly and collectively engage the RCD, MLC, political party officials,and civil society leaders in rebel-held zones on a host of fundamental rights and democracy issues. Increased involvement by U.S.-based democracy institutes during the transition period linked to the Lusaka implementation, with party and civil society representatives from both east and west, should be planned now and be the subject of close cooperation b

Neighboring countries must also be engaged as robustly as the Congo to expand opportunities for political participation and accelerate transitions to democratic rule. U.S. public statements are more effective when they advocate for democracy throughout the region rather than just in the Congo. The Lusaka process can be a catalyst for promoting dialogue and democracy throughout the Great Lakes region. Specifically, Rwanda should advance more rapidly in its electoral schedule, moving to prefect and parliament elections as soon as logistically possible; Burundi should address core issues of power sharing within the context of its Tanzania-based peace process; Uganda should ensure a level playing field for its current debates on the nature of pluralism and accept the popular will on the issue; and Zimbabwe should liberalize further in advance of the next elections. Power sharing and inclusiveness in all of these countries will lay the groundwork for eliminating support for insurgents.

As in most African countries, civil society in the DRC is a raucous, inconsistent, vibrant collection of interests, ambitions, and aspirations. Some groups are working on behalf of their communities, genuinely striving for development and coexistence. Others are simply repackaged political parties. A disturbing factor, though, is the extent to which some civil society groups appear to be fueling the sentiment in the Kivus against Tutsi or Rwandan populations. Some of these civil society leaders are feeding to the outside world misinformation about the scope of human rights abuses by all parties. Because such abuses exist, misinformation finds receptive audiences, particularly those seeking sensationalist angles that can compete with Kosovo, Sierra Leone, and Sudan for the world's attention. Civil society is largely given a free ride in international circles because of dutiful allegiance to freedom of speech and assembly. But civil society must be challenged to use responsibly their influence, information cha nnels, and leadership.

12. Human Rights Promotion As long as the ex-FAR/Interahamwe remain a threat based in the Congo, Rwandan and Ugandan forces are unlikely to depart. In the east, in addition to establishing the rule of law, some closure will have to come on the issue of citizenship, and minority rights will have to be perceived to be ensured. At that juncture, if the ex-FAR/Interahamwe threat were to be minimized, Rwanda would have no further justification for remaining in eastern Congo. As mentioned, the citizenship issue is explosive. The Congolese Tutsi population is a minute percentage of the national total. Although numbers are hotly disputed (we heard estimates that ranged from 30,000 to one million), the total is likely less than one percent of the Congo's population. The Lusaka cease-fire agreement--to which the Congolese government is a signatory--put forward the principle of citizenship for anyone in Congo at the time of independence. This principle needs to be operationalized, and the approach to establishing the law on nationality should be consultative and transparent. Rights to land and land use are inextricably linked to legal questions regarding nationality. Traditional land use arrangements allowed for ownership by the community, which in turn allows those outside the community who petition the local chiefs for land to use it. Non-Tutsi populations in Kivu claim that Tutsi communities are disrespectful of these traditions and asserting ownership. Further problems were inherited from the distortions resulting from both the colonial plantation economy and the land grabbing during the Mobutu era. The issue of land use--like citizenship--needs to be addressed through a consultative process that produces a fair and transparent way forward, including a way to increase everyone's stake by improved land use patterns, rather than simply adjudicating disputes. Perhaps the U.S. Great Lakes Justice Initiative could provide resources and forums for such a process to occur. Creating the International Coalition Against Genocide (ICAG), envisioned by the Entebbe Summit participants in March 1998, might provide a forum for more intensive international coordination in support of efforts to counter the genocidaires. This is particularly relevant in the context of the implementation of the Lusaka agreement and would be an important adjunct to the JMC. Specifically, ICAG could examine ways to strengthen and enforce UN Security Council sanctions against the ex-FAR/Interahamwe and their arms suppliers, improve export controls and customs enforcement throughout the region, create mechanisms for sharing key information and intelligence about movements of genocidaires and their suppliers, and help build dossiers against key ex -FAR/Interahamwe figures still active in the DRC conflict. ICAG could contribute to making some of the ringleaders and commanders international fugitives and share information that could contribute to the arrest and transfer of the accused to the Internati

Human rights reporting in eastern Congo has been problematic due to the lack of field verification of many of the charges made. The UN Human Rights Commission must do more extensive field research before it makes sweeping allegations. This need is relevant not just to current events but also to the process of following upon the massacres in Zaire during the 1996-97 war. Unsubstantiated allegations only feed the rumor mill and fuel local desires to check Tutsi (and Hutu) aspirations by whatever means perceived to be necessary. Ironically, this situation increases impunity and vigilante justice. It also makes coexistence more difficult by exacerbating intercommunal relations, particularly when false or exaggerated allegations pass as fact.

13. Economic Development Support In the months following the signing of the Lusaka cease-fire agreement, the provision of fast-disbursing development and investment resources will be critical, especially for the rehabilitation of the Kivu economy. If it is difficult to generate development funds, greater flexibility in the use of humanitarian aid for development purposes would go part way toward filling the gap. For the United States, the Office of Transition Initiatives, the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Economic Support Funds, and Pentagon drawdown funds will be important sources of support, in addition to regular development assistance. The U.S. Congress must make more funds available for consolidating Central African peace, because in the zero-sum game of foreign aid, increases for the DRC mean decreases for the Nigerian transition or other pressing priorities. Throughout the DRC, there is a pressing need to begin the process of constructing a viable road network. At the most micro level, supporting local labor to build village roads will increase profits going to farmers by reducing the need for middlemen. Roads will connect people and help in the process of reunifying the country.

In eastern Congo, development and humanitarian initiatives should endeavor to create opportunities for neighboring communities to cooperate and mix for economic and social reasons. Ethnic isolation should be countered through support for markets, regional schools and other initiatives in a common-areas strategy. Resources also should be used to support alternative livelihoods for those who otherwise perceive their best option to be joining a Mai-Mai unit.

14. Enhancing Security The Lusaka agreement acknowledges that all states have a collective obligation to fight against and break ties with genocidaires. Rwanda believes this agreement will provide the necessary international legitimacy to its efforts to counter genocidaires, wherever they are. It also legitimizes Uganda's battles against Sudan-supported militias, Angola's pursuit of UNITA, and Burundi's efforts to contain cross-border rebel attacks. Lusaka can become a means of increased pressure on the FDD and Palipehutu to negotiate, the ex -FAR/Interahamwe to return home, the ADF to disband, and UNITA to find alternative havens. In short, formalizing the regional security framework that neighboring states informally shared before this latest Congolese conflict would reunify the region around a common platform against the non-state actors that undermine the Congo's territorial integrity. In advance of the Lusaka agreement, the United States played a particularly important behind-the-scenes role on this issue.

For their part, the Congolese government and its allies do not believe that the Ugandan and Rwandan governments are sincere about ending their effort to unseat President Kabila. The international community must step up its efforts to build bridges between the belligerents, especially in the early stages of peace agreement implementation. The JMC is the key to the success of the entire cease-fire and subsequent peace consolidation. It must identify, assemble, register, and disarm nonstate militias. Doing so requires a rupture of the militias' current tactical alliances with the Congolese and Zimbabwean governments, and their separation from civilian populations traveling with them and often used as human shields. To succeed, international support for the mission will have to be robust: helping to plan for the logistical needs of the JMC; providing transport and communication support to the observers and JMC units; supporting the creation of an intelligence and information net; creating a mechanism to quarter and transfer militia that are captured or surrender, and providing the resources necessary to make it work; and supporting the reintegration in Rwanda of combatants (into the army or civilian life) not accused of genocide. In Operation Joint Endeavor, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization peace enforcement mission in Bosnia,

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