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give the JMC the appropriate enforcement authority.

The quick functioning of the information net will be an important confidence -building measure. It should be depoliticized and confidential, operating on the technical level among military officers, and well removed from politicians who might use information or sources in ways that would cause one or more parties to withdraw from the mechanism. Congo will require assurances that ex -FAR/Interahamwe units will not simply be killed once they are identified, but that there are procedures in place to differentiate hard-core genocidaires from others who were caught up in the war. There will also have to be some decision about whether every single member of every militia unit will be pursued, or whether leadership structures will be targeted.

Furthermore, while the UN observers are deployed, civil affairs units should maximize their impact by supporting local efforts at building infrastructure, and not lose this opportunity to get a head start on the immense task of postwar reconstruction. The UN mission should also include human rights trainers and development officers, to make the most of the deployment period.

There will have to be a clear and quantifiable end state to the Lusaka agreement implementation process, to reassure Congolese that the withdrawal of forces will occur if certain objectives are met, and to reassure the Rwandans and Ugandans that their objectives will be supported within the framework of the Lusaka implementation.

Reintegrating ex-FAR into the Rwandan army has been a key ingredient to the strategy of luring both refugees and non-genocidaire insurgents back to Rwanda. The Rwandan army says that it has reintegrated 14,000 ex-FAR since 1994. The likelihood that a high percentage of the remaining ex-FAR/Interahamwe in the DRC are hard-core genocidaires makes an incentive-based strategy for their return to Rwanda problematic. Justice needs to be served for those guilty of genocide. A blanket amnesty would destroy efforts at breaking the cycle of impunity, but a blanket offer to allow all of those in the Congo to return and only be judged if accused would be one element of a comprehensive strategy. Again, a multifaceted counterinsurgency strategy is key. The international community should help in sending messages that it is safe to go back. An important ingredient of the strategy would be development aid for facilitating reintegration of those who do go back as well as for Rwandan plans to demobilize over half

In the Congo itself, Rwandan and RCD forces should endeavor to be more protective of communities being preyed upon by Interahamwe units and support local initiatives at separating civilian populations from the parasitic control of militias. Human rights abuses by Rwandan and RCD forces must be vigorously and transparently prosecuted. Without this initiative, nearly everything they say they are fighting for is put at risk because of the increasing opposition of Congolese communities to their presence and agenda.

15. The Way Ahead The wars within the Congo and (to a lesser extent) between Ethiopia and Eritrea demonstrate the lack of faith key African actors have in international institutions. Rwanda's certainty that the world would not support its efforts to counter the genocidaires, and lack of reliance of both Eritrea and Ethiopia on international mechanisms for preventing their border dispute from becoming a war, highlight this crisis of faith and lead to increasing reliance on vigilante international justice, accompanied by serious abuses of human rights. The responsibility for restoring faith lies on both sides: the international institutions must be made to respond appropriately, and African states must agree to abide by international rules and standards, particularly with respect to cross-border military action. Although the use of force will sometimes be necessary, more dialogue at this juncture about when and how will reduce the likelihood of the unnecessary use of force as the option of first resort.

In that context, it might be worth exploring an Entebbe II summit, at which a high-ranking U.S. official could reconvene the participants in the 1998 Entebbe summit in which President Clinton participated, and reexamine some of the objectives set forth at that time in the sobering aftermath of these destructive conflicts. Such a conference could aim to address some of the fundamental themes of President Clinton's policy toward Africa, including cooperative efforts to shrink zones of instability, counter genocide, and promote democracy and human rights. Other donor countries and African officials could be invited to diversify perspectives and provide a forum to collectively consider medium and long-term requirements for peace. In sum, the Lusaka cease-fire agreement is not perfect. It is the first step in a long path to peace. Providing support to this roadmap greatly increases the chances that some of the main reasons for conflict in Central Africa will be addressed in a more cooperative and effective manner.

USIP Library Resources : Ceasefire Agreement -- signed by Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe, the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo, and the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD)
http://www.usip.org/library/pa/drc/drc_07101999_toc.html

About the Report : This special report results from a multicountry fact-finding mission by Institute Executive Fellow John Prendergast and the coordinator of the Institute's Africa programs David Smock. The authors discussed the Congo with over 200 people in government- and rebel-held areas of the Congo, Rwanda, Burundi, and Uganda, as well as with officials from the Organization for African Unity (OAU), United Nations (UN), Europe, the United States, and representatives from other countries involved in the Congolese conflict.

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