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An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace

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Peace and love
Sergio

An Analysis of the Agreement and Prospects for Peace

20 August 1999

Contents

Executive Summary

Introduction

Motivations And Strategies Of The Players: Why Sign Now? 1.A Step Towards Peace 2.Who Wins What?

Can the cease-fire agreement be implemented? 1.Assumptions at the Base of the Cease-fire Agreement 2.Post Lusaka Violations
3.Fighting Amongst the Allies? 4.Disarming of Armed Militias, a Big Job 5.Internal Dimensions of the Agreement for the Democratic
Republic of Congo 6.The Issue of a Peacekeeping Force: the
Belligerents Turned into Peacekeepers? 7.Withdrawal of Foreign Troops: Will the Deadline be Met?

Recommendations 1.At the Regional Security Level 2.At the National Level 3.At the Local Level

Annexe

Executive Summary

After a year of failed attempts by Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Organisation for African Unity (OAU), South Africa and other regional powerbrokers, the six countries involved in Africa's seven-nation war in the Democratic Republic of Congo signed the Agreement for a Cease-fire in the DRC in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. The war has pitched Kabila and his allies, Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia against a Congolese rebellion backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi since August 1998. The main provisions of the agreement
include: immediate cessation of hostilities; the establishment of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of the belligerent parties to investigate cease-fire violations, to work out mechanisms to
disarm the identified militias, and monitor the withdrawal of foreign troops according to an established calendar; the deployment of a UN chapter 7 force tasked with disarming the armed groups, collecting weapons from civilians and providing humanitarian assistance and
protection to the displaced persons and refugees; and the initiating of a Congolese National Dialogue intended to lead to a "new political dispensation in the DRC".

However, a month after signing, the war continues. While it does not dispute the content of the document, the main rebel group, the Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) has refused to sign the agreement. The RCD split earlier in May, when Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was ousted as head of the group, but refused to step down and established his headquarters in Kisangani with Ugandan backing. Both the RCD-Goma, backed by Rwanda, and the RCD-Kisangani, supported by Uganda, have demanded the exclusive right to sign the peace agreement. This has delayed the implementation of the agreement and encouraged factions to engage in strategies to buy time. Since the signing, more troops have been deployed and the rebels and their allies have continued to make territorial advances. Many claims and counterclaims of violations of the agreement have already been made, making the
commitment by both parties to the cease-fire agreement more and more suspect.

Relations between Rwanda and Uganda have grown increasingly strained since the RCD split. Soldiers from both countries have been stationed at the airport and control separate parts of the city of Kisangani. Despite recent efforts by South Africa and Zambia to verify
leadership claims and to put pressure on both factions to sign, the disagreement degenerated into open urban warfare between the two
armies on 14 August. The former allies fought for the control of several installations as well as of the city international airport, employing heavy artillery. On 17 August, Rwanda and Uganda agreed on a cease-fire. They say they will send a military team to find out why the fighting erupted. They also agree that they will respect the outcome of the investigation on leadership claims within the RCD undertaken by the South Africans and the Zambians. If the
investigation committee doesn't come up with a clear result, both will recommend that the 28 founders of RCD should sign the agreement.

The Lusaka agreement, however, meets the demands of the rebels and their supporters, and more specifically of the Rwandans by
recognising their pledge to disarm the Interahamwe and ex-FAR in the Great Lakes region. But the current fighting between Uganda and
Rwanda in Kisangani makes quite clear that the security interests of those countries, which their intervention in the DRC was supposed to protect, are not the only motivation for the war. There are neither Rwandan nor Ugandan rebel groups in Kisangani that could justify the presence of the two countries armies. Instead, the conflict seems to be a battle for commercial influence to control diamond, gold and coffee concessions, and for political influence in the region after the war is over.

The fighting between Uganda and Rwanda also legitimises Kabila's claim that those countries are aggressors, an argument the Congolese leader seized upon when he called on the Security Council to strongly condemn the violations of the cease-fire and to demand the "immediate departure" of forces from Uganda and Rwanda. His Justice Minister Mwenze Kongolo even said at the SADC meeting in Maputo that: "as far as we are concerned the Lusaka protocol is dead".

Key questions remain unanswered. Is peace in sight at last or is the stage set for the war to continue? Can the Lusaka cease-fire
agreement be resurrected in light of the glaring cease-fire
violations by both sides in the conflict? Can the pressure that was put on all the parties to sign the agreement be sustained?

The high level of tension between Uganda and Rwanda is likely to affect the geopolitical order of the region; it could lead to further fragmentation and a de facto partition of the DRC, with each army occupying a sector and a very volatile military situation. If Ugandan troops remain in the North, Rwanda could be tempted to concentrate its efforts on Mbuji-Mayi. It could also convince Uganda to give up and withdraw, leaving Rwanda alone facing accusations of aggression. Parliament members in Uganda have already announced its intentions to move a motion seeking the complete withdrawal of the troops from the DRC. And last, but not least, anti-Rwanda feelings are already growing in the Ugandan army, even though government officials in both countries have played down the impact of the Kisangani clash on the broad alliance of Uganda and Rwanda. The Ugandans have lost a lot of soldiers in the battle and some of their strongholds have been taken by the Rwandans, which is perceived as a humiliation by the UDPF.

Since the beginning of the war, the fragility of the Congolese state has been exploited by all foreign forces, whether allies or enemies of the Kabila government. For the first time, with the Lusaka
agreement, the Congolese domestic agenda was brought back to the centre stage. If the cease-fire agreement is not implemented, the continuation of violence could postpone the National Dialogue, which is key to the deployment of a peacekeeping force, the withdrawal of foreign troops, the formation of a new Congolese army and the re- establishment of state administration on DRC territory. As long as the military situation remains unresolved, it is unlikely that the Congolese will be in charge of their own fate.

This report analyses the motivations of each of the main parties to the conflict to sign the Lusaka agreement. It also looks at the
difficulties that lie ahead if the agreement is to be implemented.

Each belligerent party took the opportunity to put his own domestic concerns on record, especially by demanding that rebel groups
fighting their governments be disarmed, and also by securing a
regional commitment to address their national security interests. One of the main precedents created by the agreement is that the
belligerent parties are, through the JMC, turned into the enforcers of the agreement. The JMC is supposed to share intelligence regarding militias and work out mechanisms to disarm them. However, it will take time for the parties to overcome their suspicions and do more than make sure that their enemies don't continue supporting the rebels. Furthermore, it will be difficult for Kabila and Zimbabwe to turn against and disarm their allies, the ex-FAR and Interahamwe. Intelligence reports have already indicated that some armed groups have started going underground.

The DRC conflict has three dimensions: local, national and regional. For peace to return to the DRC, the peace process should
comprehensively deal with the conflict at all three levels. For the international community, this is a unique opportunity to re-engage with the region, to demonstrate commitment to African peace
processes, and to rebuild credibility with national partners in
Central, Eastern and Southern Africa. In particular, the
international community should support regional efforts to restore the territorial integrity of the DRC and to resolve its security
issues. Given the failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and to address the long term security issues it created, ICG recommends that the UN Security Council, its members, and the OAU seize the
opportunity to:

At the Regional Security Level

1.Put continuous pressure on all rebel factions to sign the Lusaka cease-fire agreement and on all parties to respect it

US, Security Council and regional diplomatic pressure should be directed towards Uganda and Rwanda to respect the Kisangani cease- fire; to respect their commitment to the Lusaka cease-fire; and to take a common stand on the issue of the RCD signature, so that the Congolese may start their National Debate process. Although the rebel leaders have developed their own individual and group interests, Rwanda and Uganda can still prevail on them.

2.Support the Joint Military Commission (JMC)

The Security Council Member states should undertake a serious examination of the needs of the JMC, and support those needs fully.

3.Strengthen the mandate of the OAU-appointed chairman of the Joint Military Commission

Understanding that the JMC is composed of representatives of the

belligerent parties and has no accountability nor supervision
mechanism by any neutral body, ICG recommends that the OAU should play a more active role as arbitrator of the agreement and carry out that role until the UN PK force is able to provide
accountability and supervision, as mandated in the agreement.

4.Mobilise international and regional efforts for a proactive non- military response to the Ex-FAR and Interahamwe problem by:

Putting pressure on the Kabila and Zimbabwe governments to demobilise Interahamwe and ex-FAR as a gesture of good will in

Encouraging the neighbouring countries of the DRC to make a special effort to arrest the leaders of those groups responsible for the genocide and whose names are on the list of the

Supporting a demobilisation and re-integration plan for the Interahamwe and ex-FAR, who are estimated to count between

5.The governments of the region should be strongly encouraged to practice inclusive politics and offer reintegration alternatives to their respective rebellions

6.Support a peace-keeping force in the DRC with a realistic and concrete mandate

The terms set by the Lusaka agreement ask for a chapter 7 force that will have the mandate to, among other things: "track down all armed groups in the DRC." A chapter 7 force would require at least 100 000 soldiers to monitor the situation from the Sudanese to the Zambian borders and from the Congo -Brazzaville to the
Tanzanian borders. In the event the Security Council doesn't authorise a chapter 7 force, support should be given to the JMC to carry out that mandate and more UN/OAU observers should be sent. In a second stage, a chapter 6 force should be authorised by the Security Council as a confidence building mechanism and sign that the international community has an interest in the DRC; as an observer of the implementation of the agreement; as an investigator of the violations of the cease-fire and protector of civilian populations; as a catalytic mechanism to help the
population distance itself form the fighters; and as a provider of humanitarian assistance.

At the National Level

1.Support the Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation Debate by:

Giving expert technical support to the Facilitator chosen by SADC;

Encouraging the Facilitator to include Congolese armed groups that were not represented in Lusaka. These are the Mai - Mai, the Banyamulenge and the former Mobutu soldiers, and to make sure no potential disrupters are excluded;

Enforcing the provisions in the agreement stating that all participants should have an equal status;

Monitoring the proceedings of the debate and ensuring that they are free of manipulation and intimidation.

1.Create a donor liaison group to mobilise resources for
humanitarian assistance, local reconstruction, rehabilitation of infrastructures and reconciliation initiatives at the community
level

Introduction

After one year of failed attempts by SADC and other powerbrokers to reach a settlement on the DRC conflict, the belligerents signed an agreement for a cease -fire in Lusaka on 10 July 1999. This war is the second taking place on DRC territory in two years and pits the allies of the first war against each other: rebels backed by Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi have been seeking to overthrow Kabila through the military option, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia intervened on behalf of SADC to protect DRC's sovereignty and Kabila's government. For the first time, the separate disputes being waged on DRC
territory as well as the Congolese agenda were addressed in the
Lusaka agreement. However, the commitment of the parties to the
agreement remains suspect and violence can not be ruled out.

This report has been written on the basis of many interviews with all belligerents during the Lusaka negotiations in July, and analyses the chances for peace contained in the agreement as well as its
loopholes. The main components of the documents are:

Creation of a Joint Military Commission composed by the
Belligerents and Creation of an OAU/UN Observer Group

A Joint Military Commission (JMC), composed of two representatives from each party to the conflict under a neutral chairman to be
appointed by the OAU is to be established. Signatories to the
conflict have already nominated representatives to the Commission. The duties of the JMC and of the OAU/UN Observer Group are among
other things to investigate cease-fire violations, working out
mechanisms to disarm militias and monitoring the withdrawal of
foreign troops. Both the JMC and the Observer Groups are supposed to start executing peacekeeping operations until the deployment of the UN peacekeeping force 1. The Security Council authorised the
deployment of 90 military observers on 6 August 1999.2

Deployment of a Peacekeeping Force

The UN is requested to deploy an appropriate chapter 7 force to ensure implementation of the accord. The role of the force will be to disarm the militias identified in the agreement, collect weapons from civilians, supervise the withdrawal of all other foreign troops, and provide humanitarian assistance to displaced persons and refugees 3.

Disarmament of Militia Groups

The agreement envisages the tracking down and disarming of armed groups. The screening of mass-killers and war criminals and handing them over to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in
Arusha, Tanzania 4.

Congolese National Dialogue and Reconciliation Debate

45 days after the signing of the cease-fire agreement, the DRC government, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC), unarmed opposition groups and the
Congolese civil society are supposed to begin open political
negotiations that should result in a new political dispensation in the DRC. All parties will have equal status in the debate. The
negotiations will be held under the authority of a neutral
facilitator. Topics to be tackled in the debate are democratic
elections, the formation of the national army and the re-
establishment of state administration throughout the DRC 5.

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